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I. Parallel Proceedings: Moving Into Cyberspace
Cyberselling is here to stay... Courts and legislatures must keep pace with the ever changing

world of cyberspace.'
It was bound to happen-with the pioneering movement of law into cyberspace, parallel
proceedings have also ventured into this new frontier. In fact, the paradigm for parallel
proceedings is that resulting from concurrent jurisdiction.2 And in a borderless cyberspace
world, transborder transactions have led to conflicts in jurisdiction, both judicial and prescriptive. Parallel proceedings merely magnify differences in underlying legal systems, as
illustrated by the current high profile case concerning Yahoo and its sale of Nazi memorabilia on its U.S. auction website.' Parallel proceedings in the future are likely to encompass

*Daniel G. Murphy is a partner of Loeb & Loeb LLP in Los Angeles. Louise Ellen Teitz is a Co-Chair of
the International Litigation Committee and a professor of law at the Roger Williams University School of Law
in Bristol, Rhode Island. Douglas K Mullen is Attorney Advisor, Office of General Counsel, United States
Department of Commerce. Negin Mirmirani is an associate with Loeb & Loeb LLP in Los Angeles, California.
Abby Cohen Smutny is a partner of White & Case LLP, resident in Washington, D.C. Nicole E. Erb is an
associate of White & Case LLP, resident in Washington, D.C. Joseph J. Dehner is a partner at Frost Brown
Todd, LLC in Cincinnati, Ohio. Andrew W. Green is an associate at Frost Brown Todd, LLC in Cincinnati,
Ohio. David A. Lombardero is counsel at Hughes Hubbard & Reed in Los Angeles. Scott M. Olken is an
associate with Loeb & Loeb LLP in Los Angeles. Glenn W. Rhodes is a partner in the firm of Howrey Simon
Arnold White, LLP in Menlo Park, California.
1. Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
2. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and the
parallel English proceedings.
3. League Against Racism and Antisemitism-LICRA and Yahoo! Inc., Interim Court Order, 20 November
2000, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (County Court of Paris) No. RG: 00/05308 (2000), available at
http://www.cdt.org/speech/001120yahoofrance.pdf. The initial injunction was issued on May 22, 2000. The
complaint in the United States, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, COO-21275 PVT
ADR (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2000) is available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/00122 lyahoocomplaint.
pdf. The case is also discussed in Mylene Mangalindan & Kevin Delaney, Yahoo! Orderedto Bar the Frenchfrom
Nazi Items, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2000, at B 1.

492

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

not only traditional and alternative dispute resolution but also those proceedings that take
4
place in "brick and mortar" structures and those that occur in cyberspace.
Parallel proceedings in more than one country are an increasing problem in international
litigation, resulting from a myriad of causes, including not only concurrent jurisdiction, but
also the availability of different procedural systems that encourage forum shopping.' There
are three possible responses to parallel proceedings: (1) stay or dismiss the domestic action;
(2) enjoin the parties from proceeding in the foreign forum (referred to as an antisuit
injunction); or (3) allow both suits to proceed simultaneously, with the likely attendant race
to judgment. The proliferation of multiple proceedings has led to a variety of approaches,
especially in U.S. courts, which reflect the doctrinal inconsistencies in analyzing multiple
proceedings, often with tools developed for purely domestic use. These divergent methods
highlight the need for a uniform treatment within U.S. courts of parallel proceedings involving a foreign forum. Even more, the cases reflect the burgeoning of concurrent jurisdiction and the pressing need for internationally accepted standards and harmonization.
This year's decisions reflect the divergence of viewpoints, both domestically and internationally, on ways to handle concurrent jurisdiction. But global efforts underway on many
fronts suggest the growing convergence in analysis of both procedural rules and, in some
6
areas, the underlying substantive law.
A.

PARALLEL SUITS AND E-COMMERCE

The initial suit in the Yahoo litigation was filed in Paris by two groups, the Union of
Jewish Students and LICRA, the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism.
The advocacy groups sought to enforce French laws' that forbid the sale of Nazi-related
goods, in this case through Yahoo's U.S.-based portal. In addition, they sought to compel
Yahoo to pay penalties for violating the French Penal Code in the amount of 100,000 Euros
per day for every day that Yahoo continued to violate the law. The initial French court
ruling' in May 2000 required Yahoo to block French users from accessing the Nazi-related
goods on the U.S. website and found that selling or displaying Nazi material "offended
France's collective memory."9 Yahoo! Inc., a California-based corporation, has a French
subsidiary, Yahoo! France that operates a server 0 in France but has not violated the French
Penal Code since it does not display links to Nazi-related websites. Following the initial
ruling, the Paris court appointed a panel of experts to determine the validity of Yahoo's
claim that it was not feasible technologically or financially to block French users of its
servers in the United States. On November 20, 2000, the Paris court," relying on the
4. For an interesting perspective on the Internet and dispute resolution, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going
Private:Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 151 (2000).
5. See generally LouiSE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 233-50 (1996 and 1999 Supp.) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION]; Louise Ellen Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposalto Resolve
Conflicts ofJurisdictionand Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAW. 21 (1992).
6. See infra I.D.
7. Code Plnal [C. Pn.], art. R.645-2 (Fr.).
8. League Against Racism and Antisemitism-LICRA and Yahoo! Inc., Interim Court Order (May 22,
2000), Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (County Court of Paris) No. RG: 00/05308; 00/05309 (2000).
9. Id.
10. See http://fr.yahoo.com.
11. See LICRA and Yahoo!, Interim Court Order, 20 November 2000, Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris (County Court of Paris) No. RG: 00/05308 (2000), available at www.cdt.org/speech/001120yahoo
france.pdf.
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reports of some of the experts, upheld the determination that Yahoo must comply within
three months of the order or face daily fines of 100,000 French francs per day.
Yahoo, in response to the Paris suit, filed its own suit in federal court in San Jose, California,2 seeking a declaratory judgment that the French judgment is not enforceable and
that the French court lacked jurisdiction to control Yahoo's U.S.-based website. The suit
also sought an injunction to prevent the French Anti-Semitism advocacy groups from trying
to enforce the French judgment in the United States. Yahoo has no significant assets in
France so any attempt to enforce the French fines would probably require an action in the
United States where Yahoo has assets. Thus, as a practical matter, the issue of jurisdiction
of the French court to apply French law extraterritorially would have to be litigated in U.S.
courts before any fines could be collected. In the interim, Yahoo, rather than implementing
the required filtering system, voluntarily removed Nazi-related items and started charging
users to post items on the auction site. It is not clear whether this action either mooted the
current U.S. lawsuit or satisfied the French court's order."i What is clear is the increasingly
likely presence of litigation seeking to enforce local domestic laws on foreign-based websites, and the likely reactive litigation to enjoin the proceeding or the enforcement of any
order. The underlying problem, concurrent jurisdiction will continue to spawn parallel
proceedings as long as there are not internationally agreed norms for conduct and control
of cyberspace.
B. To

STAY OR NOT TO STAY

U.S. courts faced the issue of whether to defer (or dismiss) in deference to foreign litigation in the face of conflicting prescriptive jurisdiction. Here, too, the problem has manifested itself in the realm of cyberspace in connection with trademark and copyright law.
In one recent case, Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & BarrelLtd.,14 the Illinois-based company sued an Irish retailer for trademark violation under the Lanham Act"5 and violation
of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Practices Act,' 6 based on use of its name, not only in
advertisements, but on a website as well. 7 The Illinois plaintiff owned federal trademark
and service marks and some foreign registrations for the marks, including registrations in
Ireland, the U.K., and the EU. It also maintained an interactive website, crateandbarrel.com. The Irish retailer, with one shop in Dublin, had created and registered a website,
crateandbarrel-ie.com. The Irish defendant challenged subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and in the alternative asked the court to stay the Illinois proceedings in light of
pending litigation against it in both the U.K. and Ireland.
The district court denied all motions, including that for a stay, finding that the parallel
proceedings did not conflict. "A judgment in one forum may or may not raise issues of res

12. U.S., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, COO-21275 PVT ADR (N.D. Cal.
December 21, 2000).
13.In addition, LICRA, one of the plaintiffs in the French case, challenged personal jurisdiction in the
U.S. case.
14. See EuromarketDesigns, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
15. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2001).
16. See 815 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 510/2 (2001).
17. "This opinion addresses the issue of whether an Irish retailer with an interactive website allowing Illinois
residents to order goods from Illinois for shipment to a foreign address can be sued in Illinois by an Illinois
company for violation of the Lanham Act." EuromarketDesigns, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 828.

SUMMER 2001

494

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

judicata because, although the same parties are involved, different laws are being applied
in all three forums."'" The court utilized an abstention analysis in determining whether to
stay the action that was based upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospitalv. Mercury Construction Corp.'9 That decision itself was derived from the
earlier Supreme Court opinion in ColoradoRiver WaterConservation Districtv. UnitedStates,2
which established the analysis for a federal court to abstain in purely domestic litigation for
"wise judicial administration."" '
Transposing the domestic abstention doctrine to international litigation," the Euromarket
Designs, Inc. court reviewed the significant factors: inconvenience of the forum, avoidance
of piecemeal litigation, order of filing, whether federal law provides the "rule of decision," 3
the inadequacy of the other forum to protect the party's rights, U.S. interests in adjudicating
the dispute, and international comity. Weighing heavily in the court's refusal to stay its
hand is the determination that this is a separate claim in each jurisdiction resting on each
forum's trademark laws. "[T]he claims of Lanham Act and Illinois Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act violations are not before the Irish and British courts, making them
inadequate forums in which to decide these claims. 2 4 Adding the international aspect to
its analysis, the court relied heavily on the Laker" opinion and emphasized that concurrent
jurisdiction here does not entail conflicting jurisdiction since each court is considering its
own trademark laws.

26

The same federal court 7 in AAR International,Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A.2 a granted a
motion to abstain in favor of two, possibly three, proceedings in Greece concerning the
lease of an airplane and dismissed the U.S. reverse image case. Following the ColoradoRiver
and Moses Cone precedents, the court applied a similar "laundry list of factors," 29 but put
heavy weight on the repetitive nature of the actions and the satisfactory alternative forum

18. Id. at 845.
19. SeeMoses H. Cone Memil Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
20. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Seegenerally Linda Mullenix,A
Branch Too Far.Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L. REv. 99 (1986). Seealso TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION,
supra note 5, at 238-40.
21. Colorado River Water Conservation, 424 U.S. at 818.
22. The Seventh Circuit applied the abstention doctrines in an international context in Ingersoll Milling
Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
23. This factor is taken directly from Moses Cone, which was discussing federal as opposed to state law, not
federal as opposed to foreign law.
24. Euromarket Designs, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
25. SeeLaker Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d 909.
26. In the parallel English action, the English court denied the Illinois company's request for summary
judgment. "In substance neither party trades in this country. Yet well over £100,000 in costs has been expended
here. No-one but a lawyer could call this rational." In its provisional decision, the English court discussed the
website issue at some length, as well as a print advertisement, suggesting that "[u]ltimately the question of the
extent to which national trade mark law is permitted to impinge on trade within other countries may have to
be considered by the European Court of Justice." Euromarket Designs Inc. v. Peters (Ch. 2000), available at
http://www.hrothgar.co.uk/YAWS/repseurom.htm.
27. The decision was by another DistrictJudge in the Northern District of Illinois.
28. SeeAAR Int'l, Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A., 100 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Il1.2000).
29. The Seventh Circuit directs me to consider a laundry list of factors: (1) the identity of the court that
first assumed jurisdiction over the property; (2) the relative inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the
need to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the respective proceedings were filed;
(5) whether federal or foreign law provides the rule of decision; (6) whether the foreign action protects
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3°
in Greece. "[T]he most economical use of my time is to let the Greek courts handle it." The
court also suggested that the Greek courts' decisions would be given preclusive effect since
"'there would be little reason to deny the preclusive effects' of a Greek judgment when 'the
recognizing jurisdiction has no concern with any of the parties or the underlying transaction,"' 3 a rather strange comment given that AAR is an Illinois corporation with its principal
place of business there. The case suggests that many of the courts in the Seventh Circuit
continue to view judicial economy as a significant factor counseling against allowing parallel
proceedings and continue to apply a test that relies initially on domestic abstention doctrines.
In an interesting per curiam opinion out of the Eleventh Circuit, Trujillo v. Conover &
Company Communications,32 the court reversed a stay that had been granted in deference to
earlier-filed parallel litigation in the Bahamas. The first suit was brought by the Banco
Central del Ecuador for misappropriation of funds through the use of fraudulent loan
transfers. At the time, the Ortegas were accused of a massive fraud scheme. The second
suit, that in the Unites States, was filed by the Ortegas against the bank and its public
relations firm for defamation based on the suit and press release. The district court stayed
the U.S. action pending resolution of the Bahamian proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit
found the stay to be an abuse of discretion, apparently for failing to limit the scope of the
stay or provide adequate support. In passing, the Eleventh Circuit suggested two different
reasons and support for lower court stays pending related proceedings: (1) as part ofa court's
inherent power to control the docket for the sake of judicial economy and (2) under abstention principles, here international abstention. The court appears to continue to recognize a distinct theory of international abstention as established in Turner Entertainment
Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH," and to differentiate the requirements for it14 from that of simply
a docket control stay. This contrasts with courts in other circuits, which sometimes tend to
collapse the ColoradoRiver/Moses Cone abstention cases with docket control stay cases, often
without considering the analytical differences between parallel litigation involving foreign
suits, as opposed to domestic proceedings. This myopia sometimes plays out in inaccurate
assumptions about res judicata based on the inapplicability of the Full Faith and Credit
requirements in the international arena.
Parallel proceedings often reflect significant differences in law and structural problems
in the underlying legal systems involved. Thus, the lack of internationally recognized pro-

the federal plaintiff's rights; (7) the relative progress of the federal and foreign proceedings; and (8) the

vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim.
2000) (citing Finova Capital
AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Vacanes Heliades S.A., 100 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Ill.
Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the lower
court opinion in Finova, see Louise Ellen Teitz, L ParallelProceedings: Treading Carefully, 33 INT'L LAw. 403,
404-05 (1999).
30. AAR Int'l Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
31. Id. at 877 (quoting Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 874 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd 440
F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971)).
32. See Trujillo v. Conover & Co.Communications, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262 (1lth Cir. 2000).
33. See Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994). The court also discussed
the doctrine in its recent opinion, Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209 (11 th Cir. 1999), discussed in Daniel
G. Murphy et al., InternationalLitigation, ParallelProceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity, 34 INT'L LAw.

545, 546-47 (2000).
34. Turner sets out three factors: "(1) a proper level of respect for the acts of our fellow sovereign nationsrather vague concept referred to in American jurisprudence as international comity; (2) fairness to litigants;
and (3) efficient use of scarce judicial resources." TurnerEntm't Co., 25 F.3d at 1518.
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visional measures or interim remedies35 has led to litigation in several jurisdictions-suits
on the merits and suits for freezing assets or other provisional measures.
An example is the litigation involving Viktor Kozeny and his $140 million investment
project in connection with the privatization of Azerbaijan banks. Kozeny's alleged diversion
of millions of dollars of investment funds for his own benefit, through multiple companies
he owned or controlled, spawned litigation in England, the Bahamas, and Colorado. The
investment and custodian contracts contained both English choice of law and choice of
forum clauses. The initial litigation was brought in London, in accordance with the forum
selection clause, and the London court granted a Mareva injunction, freezing Kozeny's
assets worldwide. 6 The injunction included a major Kozeny asset in Colorado, a house in
Aspen. Additional freezing orders were obtained in both the Bahamas and London. The
London court authorized several of the plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court in Colorado
where the assets were located to obtain enforcement of the freezing order. The plaintiffs
7
alleged violations of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA) and federal
RICO and securities claims, but their primary purpose was to obtain an injunction to enjoin
dissipation of assets. The Colorado court entered preliminary injunctions, following which
Kozeny applied to the London court to stay the proceedings pending the Colorado litigation, claiming that defending in two jurisdictions was burdensome and Colorado was a
3
more convenient forum. Not surprisingly, the London court denied the application.
Having lost in his effort to stay the London litigation, Kozeny then moved to stay the
Colorado proceedings. The district court, in denying the stay, correctly recognized the
international component of the litigation and the developing precedent that acknowledges
that parallel proceedings alone do not warrant abstention. The court's analysis focused on
the six factors that have appeared in many of the recent cases considering stays of litigation
39
in deference to parallel foreign litigation but tailored more to international/domestic cases:
(1) similarity of parties and issues (here many of the different parties were shell corporations
controlled by Kozeny to shelter fraudulently obtained assets); (2) promotion of judicial
efficiency; (3) adequacy of relief in the alternative forum (here the plaintiffs elected "to
forgo immediate or quick relief in Colorado" 4° in preference to establishing fraud in London before coming back to Colorado); (4) fairness and convenience of the parties, counsel,
and witnesses ("[B]oth forums present some inconvenience. However, the London Court's
decision that London is a more convenient forum, tips the scales slightly in favor of a
stay."); 41 (5) possibility of prejudice (consideration of different procedures available); and
(6) temporal sequence of filing. Citing not only Turner Entertainmentbut several other stay
cases involving parallel foreign proceedings, 42 the court emphasized the "overarching concerns for a federal court facing concurrent international jurisdiction, including demonstrating a proper level of respect for the acts of other sovereign nations, ensuring fairness to

at I.D.
35. Seeinfra

36. The London proceedings are described in the district court opinion, Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.Kozeny,
115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1244-46 (D. Colo.2000). The record in the proceedings in London was sealed.
37.
38.
39.
Mass.
40.

See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-17-101 (2000).
SeeId.
For a discussion of these factors and of Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp 2d 248 (D.
snpra note 33, at 547-49.
1999), a case relied on by the District Court, see Daniel G. Murphy et al.,
Co.,
115 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
National Union FireIns.

41. Id.
at 1246-47.
42. Seeid.
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litigants, and efficiently using scarce judicial resources." 43 These concerns are evident in
the court's sensitive and pragmatic analysis of the relevant factors. The court attempted to
coordinate the Colorado proceedings with the more advanced London proceedings, even
in connection with discovery, and deferred to the English court's denial of Kozeny's forum
non conveniens motion.
Thus, it is fair to assume that the London Court views England as the more convenient
forum and the preferred site for the trial of the principal action. This factor weighs heavily in
favor of a stay to avoid piecemeal litigation, duplicative discovery, and the threat of inconsistent
verdicts.
.. Mhe parties have begun preparing discovery in London... It is desirable for discovery
to take place in a single forum under the supervision of a single court. Otherwise, the parties
may be forced to produce the same discovery in different jurisdictions and may be subject to
contradictory discovery rulings. 44
The district court's opinion is one of a growing number of cases that have attempted to
create a consistent approach that moves beyond Colorado River/Moses Cone and domestic
4
abstention and beyond mere docket control. 1
C.

ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

Another series of cases in the last few years have resulted from differences in the enforcement of exclusive forum selection clauses. 46 But unlike the district court in Kozeny, many
U.S. courts are unwilling to defer to the chosen forum under a forum selection clause in
commercial transactions, even another common-law jurisdiction, sometimes construing the
forum selection clause narrowly and sometimes treating the issue as one of venue. Many of
these cases have involved actions brought in England to restrain proceedings elsewhere that
violate exclusive jurisdiction clauses selecting England. Recently, the English courts have
increasingly granted antisuit injunctions to enforce exclusive jurisdiction clauses, leading to
conflicting results on different sides of the Atlantic.
The Armco cases47 arise out of a management buy-out headed by Mr. Donohue and Mr.
Atkins, of a group of English insurance companies (BNIG) owned by Armco and some of
its subsidiaries. The Armco negotiators were Mr. Rossi and Mr. Stinson. Armco alleged
that Donohue, Rossi, Stinson, and later Atkins, "the group of four," conspired to defraud

43. Id. at 1247.
44. Id. at 1248. The court also emphasized that the parties can always return later to Colorado and that
even if the Colorado litigation were not stayed, the defendants' assets would be enjoined until a judgment in
the Colorado litigation, which this court suggests would not be earlier than "sometime in mid-2002" as opposed
to the anticipated date for trial in London of late 2001. Id.
45. The Tenth Circuit, in reviewing the district court's stay as part of a mandamus action filed by the
defendants, tried to fit it more into the Moses Cone precedent, in part it appears, to resolve whether the action
for mandamus was proper or whether the district court stay was immediately appealable. See In re Viktor
Kozeny, 236 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2000).
46. See, e.g., Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Heeremac, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (S.D. Tex. 1999), an example from last
year of parallel proceedings spawned by attempts to enforce a forum selection clause. See Daniel G. Murphy
etal., supra note 33, at 550-51.
47. The U.S. proceeding is Armco Inc. v. North Atlantic Ins. Co. Ltd., 68 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
The English proceedings are under the name Donohue v. Armco Inc. and Others. The lower court opinion is
reported at [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 649 (Aikens, J., dismissing application for antisuit). The appellate decision
is reported at [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 579 (C.A.) (granting antisuit injunctions).
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Armco and its subsidiaries of millions of dollars, through a complex scheme that involved
buying the insurance companies through Wingfield, a Jersey corporation, that Armco alleged was secretly owned by its own negotiators, Stinson and Rossi. Armco claimed that,
as part of the fraudulent scheme, the group persuaded Armco to inject extra money into
the failing English insurance companies and to sign contracts in connection with the sale
that contained English exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Armco brought suit against the group
of four and additional corporate conspirators 4s in the Southern District of New York to
recover funds from the fraudulent scheme, alleging common law fraud, conversion, breach
of fiduciary duty, and RICO violations. Several other suits were filed against Donohue and
others in Hong Kong, Jersey, and Singapore. Some of the defendants filed motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum non conveniens. The
defendants specifically challenged the U.S. suit as a breach of the English exclusive jurisdiction clauses contained in the transfer and sale agreements.
In the subsequent English proceedings, Donohue sought to enjoin the U.S. litigation as
vexatious and oppressive, as evidenced by its being in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction
clauses. Rossi, Stinson, and several of the related corporate entities created for the sale and
purchase, including Wingfield, applied to join as "co-claimants" in the English 49 antisuit
proceedings. The English trial court found that the exclusive jurisdiction clauses, although
valid, only bound some of the parties and that the claims in the New York lawsuit were
based on a pre-existing conspiracy and therefore did not arise out of the contracts and were
largely outside the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The court also found that the proceedings
against Donohue in New York were neither vexatious nor oppressive, England was not the
"natural forum" for the litigation, and the other co-claimants also were not entitled to an
injunction. 0 The defendants appealed the denial of the antisuit injunction."'

48. The cases in both the United States and England involved multiple parties, both individual and corporate,
some of whom were not made parties to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses or contracts and some of whom were
named in one claim or one forum and not another. This summary attempts to simplify the complex facts and
focus on the underlying suit/antisuit injunction. See Armco, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
49. See id.
50. Donohue, [19991 2 Lloyd's Rep. 649, 663.
In my view England is not the natural "centre of gravity" for these claims, which have worldwide connections. There are a large number of strands that lead to this conclusion. First the alleged conspiracy is said
to have originated in meetings in the U.S. and culminated in a secret written agreement of the group of
four in New York... Seventhly, the RICO statute claims can only be brought in the U.S.A....
By contrast the connections with England are slim ....
In my view where the Court is concerned with
where large scale commercial litigation might be fought, it should not judge the convenience of witnesses
of fact too finely. With modern communications evidence from witnesses in different parts of the world
can be taken relatively easily....
Having considered all the factors as best I can, I have concluded that the NY proceedings against Mr.
Donohue are not "vexatious and oppressive". This is fundamentally for two reasons. First because I have
concluded, overall, that England is not the natural forum in which to bring these claims. Secondly... the
other Armco companies are not bound by an EJC [exclusive jurisdiction clause] and it is clear that they
will wish to pursue their claims against Mr. Donohue in the NY proceedings....
Id.
51. The courts on both sides of the Atlantic also spent significant time discussing the interrelationship of
both the Armco conglomerate of companies and the individual and corporate defendants, particularly in connection with which parties were signatories to contracts and which were bound by the exclusive jurisdiction
clauses. This analysis was also relevant in proceedings in both New York and London in the analysis of the
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In the interim, the district judge in the New York proceeding denied the motions to
dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum non conveniens. The
court agreed with the plaintiffs that the forum selection clauses did not cover the pending
litigation and were unenforceable because they were induced by fraud:
The Court finds that the allegations of a wide-ranging conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs are not
claims that fall under the scope of the Forum Selection Clause contained in the Sale Contract
...The 'gist' of plaintiffs' claims is not breach of a contractual relationship, but a series of
acts by defendants resulting in fraud."
In addition, the court found that "[e]ven if the Forum Selection Clause did apply to this
dispute, it would not bar the present proceeding because plaintiffs have properly alleged
that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the Clause."" Finally, the district court
denied the forum non conveniens motion, 4 relying specifically on the intervening English
trial court opinion to demonstrate that the United States had a greater interest in the action.
In the concluding act in these proceedings, this time in England, the Court of Appeal"
reversed the lower trial court and issued an antisuit injunction prohibiting the Armco entities from proceeding in New York. It determined that the New York proceedings were
within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause. The English court provided a clear
statement of the principles to be applied when ruling on an antisuit injunction to restrain
proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Contrary to the lower
court's approach of looking at the most appropriate place for the litigation, when there is
an exclusive jurisdiction clause, there has to be a strong reason not to grant an antisuit
injunction. The burden is on the party opposed to the injunction. This approach not only
reduces satellite litigation, it also enforces the contractual agreement, giving the parties the
benefit of their bargain.
One of the most interesting aspects of the case is the Court of Appeal's consideration of
what effect to give to the intervening judgment of the district judge in the U.S. proceedings.
The Court of Appeal found that even though the district judge refused to dismiss for forum
non conveniens, comity did not require the English court to refuse the antisuit injunction.
The Court of Appeal determined that the district judge relied in part on an incorrect
opinion of the English trial court concerning the effect of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses
and their not being within the scope of the New York litigation. The Court of Appeal said
that the U.S. court was wrong about the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause that was
ultimately a matter of construction and a matter of English law. In addition, the district
judge's finding that the clauses were fraudulently induced was not supported by the trial
court's finding in England, and the mere allegation of fraud was insufficient to void the
clauses under English law. "If this means that merely by alleging fraud a party can avoid an

question of duplication of litigation. In addition, in the antisuit proceedings, besides Donohue individually,
there were several "co-claimants" (two individuals and four corporations, referred to by the Court of Appeal
as "PCCs") who were ultimately also granted an injunction, even though all but one were not parties to any
exclusive jurisdiction clause, but were considered necessary and proper parties for the English proceedings.
52. Armco, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.
53. Id. at 340.
54. "Although trial in England would be an adequate alternative forum, the court concludes that the relevant
private and public factors indicate that litigating this case in the United States is completely appropriate." Id.
at 341.
55. Donohue v. Armco Inc., [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 579 (C.A.).
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EJC [exclusive jurisdiction clause], I have to confess to finding it a surprising doctrine and
is certainly not consonant with English law."'56 Nor is comity required just because the U.S.
court had jurisdiction and Donohue had delayed in seeking the help of the English courts. 7
"The question therefore is whether this Court as a matter of comity should exercise its
discretion and refuse to grant injunctive relief to Mr. Donohue... in deference to a foreign
judgment with which it disagrees. I think not."58 Thus where there is an exclusive English
forum selection clause at issue in parallel proceedings, English courts ultimately consider
the scope of that clause a matter of English law, and they will continue to presume that an
antisuit injunction should issue to enforce the clauses even in the face of conflicting parallel
determinations. The strong value placed by English courts on upholding forum selection
clauses, including arbitration clauses, 9 will continue to overrule notions of comity, even
with respect to parallel common-law jurisdictions and will create friction when the parallel
forum chooses not to uphold or to invalidate the exclusive forum clause.
On the home front, in the area of domestic antisuit injunctions, the case law remained
stable, 60 with one interesting variation, that of enjoining a third-party defendant in an admiralty case involving about 1,000 claimants in a limitation proceeding. 6' The third-party
defendant sought a declaratory judgment of nonliability in Korea but with only three of
the cargo claimants as parties. In granting the antisuit injunction, the district court stressed
the "unusual size and complexity" of the limitation proceeding and the concern with potential collateral estoppel effects from any Korean judgment.
D.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE/TiNG Up LOOSE ENDS

Dispute resolution generated by electronic commerce 62 is receiving global attention, both
in the business-to-consumer and business-to-business contexts. Governmental, intergov-

56. Id. at 592.
57. Lord Grabiner [counsel for Armco] submits that Mr. Donohue has delayed here; the foreign Court has
accepted jurisdiction, and even if according to English law principles it was wrong to do so, as a matter
of comity we should give effect to that decision by exercising our discretion not to grant the injunction.
If we do not exercise restraint there is a danger of conflicting jurisdictions, which the Court will strive
to avoid .... [T]o give way to this argument puts a premium on a race in different jurisdictions, where
the individual, albeit a wealthy one, may be at a disadvantage against a corporation with assets of over
U.S. $1800 m.
Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., XL Insurance Ltd v. Owens Corning, [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 530 (Q.B.D.). The underlying
dispute involved a claim under an insurance contract and the applicability of a London arbitration clause. The
initial suit was filed in Delaware against the insurers for a declaration of liability. An antisuit injunction was
issued in London restraining Owens Corning from continuing to pursue its claim in the U.S. courts contrary
to the arbitration clause.
60. See Daniel G. Murphy etal., supra note 33, at 550-51. For a thorough discussion of the two approaches
to antisuit injunctions, see generally George Bermann, The Use ofAnti-Suit Injunctionsin InternationalLitigation,
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990); Richard W. Raushenbush, Note, Antisuit Injunctions andlnternational
Comity, 71 VA. L. REv. 1039 (1985).
61. In re Rationis Enters., Inc. of Panama, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10226 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

62. Electronic commerce dispute resolution embraces two concepts: (1) disputes that are generated by electronic transactions, whether handled on-line or off-line; and (2) disputes that are resolved electronically,
whether the source of the dispute is on-line or off-line. Sometimes the two overlap, such as in connection with
domain name disputes subject to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which
are generated by electronic commerce and are also resolved by an on-line dispute resolution process.

VOL. 35, NO. 2

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES

501

ernmental, and private entities have turned their efforts to creating guidelines, protocols,
and standards for dispute resolution in cyberspace. Some of those involved at the moment
besides the U.S. government63 include the European Union, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.64 The American Bar Association (ABA) is also addressing issues of jurisdiction in cyberspaces and more specifically dispute resolution issues, the latter as part
of an ABA-wide effort to create standards and protocols for multi-jurisdictional disputes
66
that incorporate dispute resolution providers and users as well.
The proliferation of efforts to study and regulate disputes resulting from electronic commerce or resolved in electronic commerce 67 threatens to create conflicting standards in
multiple forums with different participants unless there is more effort to establish inclusive
approaches that incorporate both private and public sectors in both developed and emerging
economies. The inherently overlapping spheres of cyberspace are likely to generate multiple
proceedings, 6 both in traditional forums and in the cybercourts of the future. 69 Although
we may often describe cyberspace as "borderless," national governments are not willing to
cede all power of regulation or control to transactions occurring in the cyberworld.

63. Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce have taken a major lead in this
area globally. The U.S. government, like other governmental and non-governmental entities, also has several
different agencies and organizations studying aspects of electronic commerce and is illustrative of the fragmented approach evident especially in the area of consumer use of the Internet and electronic commerce dispute
resolution.
The U.S. Congress has also been actively pursuing the issue of jurisdiction in cyberspace in connection with
the Internet. The House Judiciary Committee, subcommittee on courts and intellectual property has been
looking at those issues that are relevant to federal court jurisdiction. The Subcommittee held hearings onjune
29, 2000 to consider The Internet and Federal Courts: Issues and Obstacles. See Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearing Testimony Presented to Subcommittee on Courts & Intellectual Property, available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/4.htm.
64. See, e.g., Council of the European Union, Directive on electronic commerce, 14263/1/99 REV 1 (Feb.
28, 2000), availableat http://europa.eu.intcomm/internal-market/en/ecommerce/2k-442.htm;ElectronicData
Interchange, Internet and Electronic Commerce, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc.
No. 7, Apr. 2000, available at http://www.hcch.netle/workprog/e-comm.htnl.
65. See Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: Jurisdictional Issues Created by the Internet,
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/initiatives/urisdiction.htnl. This project was begun in 1998,
under the leadership of the Section of Business Law, Committee on the Law of Cyberspace. Tom Vartanian
chaired the Committee.
66. See ABA E-Commerce and ADR Task Force, which was established in Fall 2000, and has a website with
information and links to major sources in the area. See http://www.law.washington.edu/ABA-eADR/home.htnl.
67. In fact, dispute resolution that is provided on-line, either traditional litigation or alternative dispute
resolution becomes itself a form of electronic commerce.
68. See INTERNET, WHICH COURT DECIDES? WHICH LAW APPLIES? PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COLLOQUIUM IN HONOUR OFMICHEL PELICHET (Katharina Boele-Woelki & Catherine Kessedjian eds., 1998).
69. The ability to establish mechanisms for filing of documents electronically and to conduct a dispute system
electronically, or a "paperless court system," is illustrated by the innovative court electronic filing system
established by the Singapore Judiciary and in operation in the Supreme Court and the Subordinate Courts of
Singapore. The basic procedures and rules for the Subordinate Courts are outlined in Practice Direction
No. 3 of 1999. See Practice Direction No. 3, The Subordinate Courts of Singapore, Policies and Procedures,
available at http://www.gov.sg/judiciary/subct/index.htnl. The complete transfer from paper to electronic
transactions by the Singapore courts provides an example of ways to utilize new technology that should be
adaptable to other forms of dispute resolution, such as to arbitral tribunals and mediation entities.
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The work continues ° at the Hague Conference on Private International Law on a Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Preliminary Draft, October 30, 1999), 1 but with a changed timetable" that includes more
informal experts meetings. The Diplomatic Conference, originally planned for Fall 2000
was divided into two sessions, the first to be held in June 2001, and the second at the end
of 2001 or the beginning of 2002.13 As mentioned last year, the most recent draft includes
a lis pendens with the possibility of a limited forum non conveniens.
The American Law Institute (ALL) has continued with a project to draft transnational
rules of procedure.14 The ALI and the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT) have joined to draft a code of principles of international civil litigation.
Their project could form the basis for harmonization in private commercial litigation. The
current ALI draft, however, does not cover lis pendens or parallel proceedings. The joint
ALI/ UNIDROIT project happily has acknowledged the importance of a uniform approach
to lis alibi pendens. Differences in approach to parallel litigation as well as differences in
jurisdiction "are a permanent source of conflict between the courts of different nations and
often hinder the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments."" Additional efforts
at harmonization of aspects of transnational litigation are also underway at the International
Bar Association as part of its Common Principles Project. The International Law Association has also recently completed a project covering both forum non conveniens and parallel
proceedings, the Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in
Civil and Commercial Matters (London 2000).6 Efforts to harmonize approaches to parallel proceedings from a procedural standpoint could lead to a more consistent and predictable, as well as, less abrasive method of handling parallel proceedings and reduce the
costs to parties and judicial systems.
The type of parallel proceedings generated in part by attempts to freeze assets and obtain
interim relief, as represented by the Kozeny litigation, is receiving some attention both in
70. Although not the first or only court system to incorporate electronic technology, the Singapore system
is a comprehensive attempt to integrate all aspects of operations. The project requires electronic filing of many
cases. The system also allows law firms to receive documents from the court in electronic form. The system
utilizes video-conferencing, for instance for evidence that is given in the United States for a Singapore proceeding. In addition to providing an economical solution to transborder actions or actions involving parties or
witnesses in different physical locations, it also is utilized with vulnerable witnesses, such as children and rape
victims, and security-risk witnesses, such as prisoners who might otherwise have to be transported between
prison and court. The video-conferencing and electronic technology also facilitate locating interpreters at one
place. The court has also set up computer-based recording transcription facilities, which permit in-court testimony to be recorded digitally as computer files. See Daniel G. Murphy et al., supra note 33, at 553.
71. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html.
72. This change was precipitated in part by the U.S. reaction to the October 1999 draft and the concerns
expressed in February 2000 by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Assistant Legal
Adviser for Private International Law.
73. The session scheduled for June 2001 at The Hague will suspend the ordinary rules and attempt a
consensus approach.
74. ALI PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, (Preliminary Draft No. 2 March 7,
2000), available at http://www.ali.org/ali/transrles.htm.
75. Rolf Siirner, Some European Remarks on a New JointProject of the American Law Instituteand UINIDROIT,
34 Iwr'L LAW. 1071, 1073 (2000).
76. Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters
(London 2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/RESlitigation.pdf(last visited July 6, 2001).
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connection with litigation and in connection with arbitration, the later often spawning
proceedings in courts. The International Law Association Principles on Provisional and
Protective Measures in International Litigation," published in 1996, laid the framework
for continued efforts toward harmonization that does not necessarily remove the need for
multiple proceedings in different locations but does reduce some of the friction resulting
from differing standards and approaches. These principles have been taken up in connection
with arbitration in the current work of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).8 In the context of litigation, the ALI's recent draft of the Trans79
national Rules of Procedure also includes a rule concerning Provisional Remedies.
These varied and multiple approaches to transnational litigation offer the promise of
harmonization in several areas and thus the hope for the attendant reduction in the amount
of concurrent litigation and the friction it generates.

H. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
The law of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States is codified by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).8° The FSIA grants foreign states immunity from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of several exceptions applies. Decisions in 2000 shed
2
81
light on (1) the definition of a foreign state, (2) the waiver of immunity exception, and
s3
(3) the commercial activity exception.

77. See Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, The International Law Association
Sixty-Seventh Conference, available at http://www.izpr-anwrecht.jura.uni-muenchen.de/Helsinki.htm. "Provisional and protective measures perform two principal purposes in civil and commercial litigation: (a) to
maintain the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial; or (b) to secure assets out of which an
ultimate judgement may be satisfied."
78. See Working Group on Arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, 33rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.1 11 (2000); Working Group on Arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 32nd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IIIWP.108, paras. 63-108 (2000).
79. ALl PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 14, (Preliminary Draft No. 2
March 7, 2000), availableat http://www.ali.org/ali/transrules.htm.
80. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
81. "Foreign state" is defined to include a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state means any entity that is a separate
legal person, corporate or otherwise, and that is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or
a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and that is neither a citizen of a State of the United States nor created under the laws of any third
country. 28 U.S.C § 1603(a) (2000).
82. A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States
in any case in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding
any withdrawal of the waiver that the foreign state may purport toeffect except in accordance in with the terms
of the waiver. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000).
83. A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States
in any case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an actperformed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (2000).
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DEFINITION OF A "FOREIGN STATE"

U.S. courts continued to define what entities are entitled to immunity by interpreting
the FSIA's definition of a "foreign state" or an "instrumentality" of a foreign state. In
defining these terms decisions in 2000 discussed tiering, derivative immunity, and the timing
of foreign government ownership.
1. Tiering
An instrumentality of a foreign government includes an entity that is a separate legal
person, a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign government, and that is neither a citizen of a State of the United States nor created under the
laws of any third country. 4 An unsettled question is whether a foreign government must
directly own a majority of shares in an entity for immunity to apply or whether indirect
ownership will confer immunity. 5
In Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 86 the Fifth Circuit found a corporation indirectly owned by
Israel to be a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA.57 The plaintiffs sued manufacturers
for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to chemicals while working at banana farms.11 The
court concluded that the defendant Dead Sea Bromine Company was a foreign state for
purposes of the FSIA and therefore entitled to immunity from suit. 9
In Parex Bank v. Russian Savings Bank, 9° a New York district court found a Russian bank
indirectly owned by the Russian government to be a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. 91
The plaintiff originally sued Sberbank in state court for allegedly not performing on a
nondeliverable forward exchange contract, but Sberbank, claiming to be a foreign state,
removed the case to federal court. 92 Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court,
but the district court concluded that defendant Sberbank was a foreign state for purposes
of the FSIA and therefore entitled to removal to federal court. 93
2. Derivative Immunity
Courts have recognized that contractors and common law agents acting within the scope
of their employment are entitled to immunity when following the commands of a foreign
84. See28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
85. The Ninth Circuit withheld immunity from a corporation indirectly owned by a foreign government
through an instrumentality (another corporation), whereas the court reasoned immunity would be granted if
the foreign government directly owned the corporation. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th
Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit granted immunity to a corporation indirectly owned by a foreign state, reasoning that an instrumentality is equivalent to a foreign state and a majority ownership interest by either a
foreign state or its instrumentality will provide immunity. See In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d
932 (7th Cir. 1996).
86. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
87. See id. at 176.
88. See id. at 169.
89. See id. at 175-76 (stating that the State of Israel owns a majority interest in Israel Chemicals Limited,
an entity that owns a majority interest in Dead Sea Works Limited, which owns a majority interest in Dead
Sea) (also stating that indirect or tiered majority ownership is sufficient (in the 5th Circuit) to qualify an entity
as a foreign state, assuming that all other requirements of the commercial activity exception apply).
90. Parex Bank v. Russian Say. Bank, 81 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
91. See id. at 508.
92. Seeid. at 506.
93. See id. at 508. Sberbank is entitled to removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which states
that a foreign state as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) may remove any civil action brought against it in state
court to the district court of the United States for the district embracing the place where such action is pending.
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state employer. 94 In Butters v. Vance International,Inc.,95 the Fourth Circuit granted immunity
96
to a company providing security for Princess Anud of Saudi Arabia. The plaintiff, an
she was not
because
discrimination
gender
claimed
company,
the
security
employee of
promoted while on detail for Saudi Arabia. 97 The district court decided that the security
company was following the policy of its employer, Saudi Arabia, in not promoting the
9
employee and therefore the company was entitled to derivative immunity. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed.
3. Timing of Ownership
Another issue identified by courts in deciding whether an entity is a foreign state or an
instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA is the timing of ownership of
the entity by the foreign state. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has decided that an entity
must be an instrumentality of a foreign state at the time the lawsuit is filed in order to gain
foreign state status, 99 whereas other courts require an entity to be an instrumentality of a
10 0
foreign state at the time the conduct at issue took place.
°
In Vasura v. Acands,' ' a New York district court held that a defendant once owned by
12
the Canadian government was not an instrumentality and could not claim immunity. The
plaintiff, suing originally in state court for injuries allegedly resulting from exposure to
asbestos, sought to have the case remanded to state court, claiming that defendant Atlas
03
Turner, Inc. was not an instrumentality of the Canadian government. The court concluded that Atlas Turner was not an instrumentality of the Canadian government (and that
removal to federal court was improper) because it was owned by the Canadian°4government
neither at the time of the conduct at issue nor at the time the suit was filed.'
B.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

Once a court determines that a defendant is a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA, that
defendant is entitled to immunity from suit unless an exception applies, such as where a
5
defendant waives immunity either explicitly or implicitly.0 Courts tend to interpret an

94. See Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 79 F.3d 1145 (5th Cir. 1996); Butters v. Vance Int'l, Inc., 225
F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000).
95. Butters, 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000).
96. See id. at 464.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 466-67 (stating that "[tlhis conclusion did no more than recognize well-settled law that
contractors and common law agents acting within the scope of their employment for the United States have
derivative sovereign immunity" and that "li]t is but a small step to extend this privilege to private agents of
foreign governments.").
99. See Straub v. A.P. Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994).
100. See General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1380-82 (8th Cir. 1993); Gould, Inc. v.
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cit. 1988); Pere v. Nuovo Pignone,, Inc., 150 F.3d 477,
480-81 (5th Cir. 1998).
101. Vasura v. Acands, 84 F. Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
102. See id. at 535. The Second Circuit has not decided when ownership is required by the foreign state in
order for an entity to be considered an instrumentality and claim immunity under the FSIA. See id. at 534.
103. See id. at 532.
104. See id. at 535 (stating that Atlas Turner was not owned by the Canadian government during either of
the controlling time periods for FSIA purposes, having been acquired eleven years after the alleged exposure
and sold ten years before this suit was filed).
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994).
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implicit waiver narrowly, as in S & Davis International,Inc. v. Yemen,' °6 where the Eleventh
Circuit found no implicit waiver where a foreign state participated in an arbitration in
London, England. 07 The plaintiff sued to enforce an arbitration award for breach of contract under the waiver exception to the FSIA. Even though the defendant participated in
an arbitration in a country that had signed the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (the Convention) and enforcement of the arbitration was sought
in a country that had also signed the Convention (the United States), the court found no
implicit waiver because the defendant, Yemen, had not signed the convention. 0 The court
found, however, that the defendant had waived its immunity under another exception to
the FSIA, the "arbitration exception." 1' 9
In Wasserstein Perella Emerging Markets Finance v. Province of Formosa,"0 a New York
district court held that there was no explicit or implicit waiver by the defendant foreign
state in a breach of contract action concerning the private sale of debt securities."' One of
the documents in the sale agreement stated that the agreement would be governed by, and
construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York."' The court held this was
neither an explicit nor an implicit waiver," 3 but then held that the private sale fit within
4
the commercial activity exception."
The same district court found an implicit waiver of immunity where letters of guarantee
stated that the guarantee was subject to the laws of the United States of America.' In
Lafarge Canada Inc. v. Bank of China,l 6 letters of guarantee were issued by the Bank of
China to secure a contract between JingJang, a shipbuilder, and Lafarge. When JingJang
allegedly breached its contract, the guarantee became due. The court held that although
the Bank of China was entitled to immunity under FSIA, it implicitly waived immunity by
issuing letters of guarantee governed by U.S. law." 7

106. S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000).
107. See id. at 1301.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1302. The court followed Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
which had also held that although the waiver exception did not apply, the arbitration exception did apply. See
S & Davis Int'l, 218 F.3d at 1301-02.
110. Wasserstein Perella Emerging Mkt. Fin. v. Province of Formosa, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6416
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
111. See id. at *5, *6, *22.

112. Seeid.
at *14. The Engagement Letter also stated that the Company irrevocably consented to "personal

jurisdiction and venue in any court of the State of New York or any Federal court sitting in the Southern
District of New York for the purposes of any suit, action or other proceeding arising out of [the] agreement."
113. See id. at *19-22 (stating that language in Engagement Letter istoo vague to say the defendant recognized an explicit waiver under FSIA and also stating that while language in Engagement Letter appears to
fit
within an example of a waiver in the legislative history of the FSIA, it isnevertheless unclear whether the
defendant implicitly waived its immunity under the FSIA).
114. See id. at *26 (stating that "all the requirements of the commercial activity exception enunciated in the
third clause of § 1605(a)(2) are present.").
115. See Lafarge Can., Inc. v. Bank of China, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14253 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
116. Id. at *3-4.
117. See id. at *6.The Letters of Guarantee stated that "this Guarantee is subject to the laws of the United
States of America." Recognizing that there is no "law of the United States of America" applicable to the claims,
the court allowed the parties to argue the state law that they believed should govern the dispute. Id.
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EFFECTS

In Haven v. Rzeczpospolita,"i the Seventh Circuit followed the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson," 9 applying 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) and holding that for
a foreign state to waive immunity under the commercial activity exception, the lawsuit must
be based upon the commercial activity.2 0 Plaintiffs sued the Republic of Poland and a Polish
insurance company for property that was illegally seized during World War I. 121The plaintiffs argued that the insurance company conducts commercial activity in the United States
through Internet advertisements.'22 The court held, however, that the action for illegally
23
seized property bore no relation to the defendants' current commercial activity.
In Parex Bank v. Russian Savings Bank,2 4 a New York district court followed the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Argentina v. Weltover Inc.'25 by holding that payment due in a
New York bank account was a commercial activity that caused a direct effect in the United
26
States, thus waiving immunity through the commercial activity exception. The plaintiff
sued the Russian bank for its alleged failure to honor a nondeliverable forward-exchange
contract.' The court found that the Russian bank was a foreign sovereign acting outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity that caused a
direct effect in the United States. 28 As in J'eltover, a monetary deposit due in a New York
bank account caused enough of a direct effect in the United States to meet the commercial
exception requirement. 29

m.

International Forum Selection and Forum Non
Conveniens

As the D.C. Circuit aptly stated this year, "while the forum-selection clause defense is a
creature that has evaded precise classification, most courts and commentators have characterized it as a venue objection analogous to a forum non conveniens motion or motion
for transfer of venue." 5 " Thus, it is fitting that developments in the two areas of forum
selection and forum non conveniens should be explored together.

118. Haven v. Rzeczpospolita, 215 F.3d 727 (2d Cir. 2000).
119. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
120. See id. at 356-58; Rzeczpospolita, 215 F.3d at 736.
121. See Rzeczpospolita, 215 F.3d at 730.
122. See id. at 736.
123. See id. at 736 (stating that "[a]ny current efforts by [the insurance company] to market insurance in the
United States have no relationship to [the insurance companyl's role in the nationalization of property in
Poland after World War I").
124. Parex Bank v. Russian Sav. Bank, 116 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
125. Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
126. See Parex Bank, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
127. See id. at 419.
128. See id. at 421.
129. See id. (stating that the Second Circuit requires the conduct having a direct effect in the United States
be "legally significant" for the commercial activity exception to apply and that the money supposed to be
deposited in a New York bank caused a legally significant direct effect in the United States).
130. Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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A. 2000

DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

1. Federal Developments'3'
A review of 2000 and early 2001 federal case law clearly shows that courts are continuing
to reinforce the central principle of the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 12 that international forum-selection clauses should generally be enforced based on international comity, public policy, and contract law. As noted below, the
central precepts of the Bremen decision are alive, well, and generally followed by federal as
well as state courts.
In Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Golden Management Co., Ltd.,'33 the court found that plaintiff had
failed to make a prima facie showing that the forum-selection clause was unenforceable and
accordingly granted the motion to dismiss.'11 The court applied the four Bremen factors for
determining whether a party has overcome the presumption of enforceability accorded
forum-selection clauses,' and found that plaintiff had not met its "heavy burden" in this
regard.136

In this case, the forum-selection clause required any dispute arising under a bill of lading
to be decided in the country in which the carrier has its principal place of business (here
Korea)."' Plaintiff also argued that the forum-selection clause was not exclusive because it
provided an option to the carrier to arbitrate disputes arising under the bill of lading in
New York before, and in accordance with the rules of, the Society of Maritime Arbitrators.
The court disagreed with this reading because the bill of lading provided for settlement of
disputes either according to the forum-selection clause or by arbitration. Because the parties
had not chosen to arbitrate, the court concluded that the arbitration provision did not
impact the enforceability of the forum-selection clause.'
Watkins v. M/V London Senator'19 is another admiralty case, involving alleged negligence
that resulted in damage to cargo. The court followed closely the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,140 in which the Court had
enforced a bill of lading's foreign-arbitration clause and, more importantly, had effectively
overruled a line of Circuit Court decisions invalidating forum-selection clauses in Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) cases. 141 Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted because
131. Other reported cases include Nauert v. NAVA Leisure USA, Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6862 (10th
Cir. 2000); Chloe Z Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Lehman
Bros. Comm. Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16445 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mahon Ltd. v. AfriCarib Enters., 29 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
132. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1972) [hereinafter Bremen].
133. Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Golden Mgmt Co., Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
134. Seeid. at*5, *9.
135. The four Bremen factors are whether (1) the forum selection clause is invalid for fraud or overreaching;
(2) the forum selection clause will deprive plaintiff of its day in court due to grave inconvenience or unfairness
of the selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law will deprive plaintiff of a remedy; and
(4) enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the action was
brought. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-17.
136. Stemcor, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 (citing New Moon Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Man B & W Diesel
AG, 121 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cit. 1997)).
137. Stemcor, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 at *2.
138. Seeid. at*7.
139. Watkins v. MV London Senator, 112 F. Supp. 2d 511 (E.D. Va. 2000).
140. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
141. Watkins, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
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clause and choice of law clause deprived the U.S. courts
the bill of lading's forum-selection
42
of subject-matter jurisdiction.1
2. State Developments
In Cambridge Biotech Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics,14 1 plaintiff and defendant had
entered into two cross-licensing agreements that contained a forum-selection clause, requiring that any claims be brought in France. Because the two parties were sophisticated
and voluntarily agreed in advance that any action arising under the licensing agreement
would be brought in France, the court upheld the provision, which provided, "[s]hould any
the parties
controversy exist or arise under the present Agreement, it is herewith agreed 1that
44
shall bring it before the courts in the country of the respective defendant."'
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the forum-selection clause did not apply to
their claims against defendant because they arose from the orders of a bankruptcy court
rather than from the licensing agreement. 4 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
adopted the view of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bremen that for a court to conclude that
enforcement of a forum-selection clause in a freely negotiated international commercial
transaction is unfair or unreasonable, the party who seeks to escape the consequences of
and
the clause must show that "trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult
46
inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court."'
Plaintiffs argued that referring the dispute to a French court would be unfair and unreasonable because French courts are unfamiliar with the principles of American bankruptcy
and that a French court would be unable to interpret bankruptcy orders properly. The court
considered the affidavits of experts, and concluded that a French court could indeed interpret the bankruptcy order in a reasonable and just way, holding that "Massachusetts law
requires us to respect [the parties'] wishes, and international comity requires us to respect
47
the ability of the French courts fairly and competently to settle the parties' dispute."
B. 2000

DEVELOPMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL FORUM NON CONVENIENS

1. FederalDevelopments
The federal courts saw heavier activity in the area of forum non conveniens than in
forum-selection clauses.'" In Bestor v. Costa Crociere,

49

American couples traveling on an

142. The district court in New Jersey was faced with a similar situation in CBJ, Inc. v. M/V "Hanjin Hong
Kong," 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20288 (D.NJ. 2000). Once again at issue was a bill of lading that contained a
forum selection clause requiring that any lawsuit be brought in Seoul, Korea. Relying on Bremen and Sky Reefer,
the court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint based on the forum selection clause, and explicitly stated
that the distance from the court to Seoul, Korea and the possibility of differences in law did not, without more,
require a court to reject the selection of that forum. Also relevant was the fact that the Korean Commercial
Code provides at least some of the same protections as U.S. law. Id. at *6-7.
143. Cambridge Biotech Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics, 740 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. 2000).
144. Id. at 123. Massachusetts law was to govern the interpretation of the agreements. Id.
145. Seeid. at 128.
146. Id. at 130.
147. Id. at 133.
148. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing forum non
conveniens under Alien Tort Claim's Act); Lafarge, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14253 (granting defendant's motion
to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens denied because forum not inconvenient); loannidis v. M/V
Sea Concert, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19999, at *8 (D.Ct. Or. 2000) (recommending plaintiff's claim for
dismissal for forum non conveniens because Greece and Cyprus provided better forum for lawsuit and there
was valid forum selection clause designating Cyprus as chosen forum); Kanematsu USA, Inc. v. MN Pretty
Prosperity, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10000 (E.D. La. 2000).
149. Bestor v. Costa Crociere, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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Italian cruise liner were injured in an accident involving an automobile operated by the
cruise liner at a port in Vietnam.5 0 The plaintiffs first sued the Italian cruise liner and its
agents in Dade County circuit court. After those actions were dismissed on grounds of
forum non conveniens, the plaintiffs tried to sue once again, this time in federal court.
The issue of forum non conveniens was fully litigated in the Florida courts, which unequivocally held that the actions could not be prosecuted in Florida because of lack of any
relationship to Florida.' The federal court thus had to consider whether it could entertain
a diversity action when a Florida court had already dismissed an identical prior state court
action for forum non conveniens. Thus, the case presented the interesting issue of whether
the plaintiffs should be allowed to obtain a different result in federal court than they did in
state court "just a few blocks away."'' 2 The federal court held that they should not.
Before reaching its final result, the court was obliged to apply the Eerie doctrine because
of a conflict between federal and state law: the Florida analysis looks to the action's contacts
with Florida while the federal analysis looks to the action's contacts with the United
States." 3 The court determined Eerie dictated that Florida law be applied. 54 Because there
was no "overriding federal interest" supporting application of the federal standard over the
state standard, the motion was dismissed for forum non conveniens.'" 5
A pair of New York cases illustrates that there are different considerations in the forum
non conveniens analysis depending upon whether the court is faced with a U.S. or a nonU.S. plaintiff. In a class action brought by two groups of plaintiffs, one on behalf of U.S.
citizens and the other on behalf of aliens, who together constituted a class of "all persons
who themselves or whose family members were Jewish victims and survivors of the Nazi
Holocaust in France, their heirs and beneficiaries, and whose assets were deposited in or
processed by or converted by one or more of Defendant banks during or after the Holocaust
and not returned," defendant foreign banks could not establish that an adequate alternative
forum was available to plaintiffs.'

6

Defendants argued that the court should defer to proceedings in France and decline
jurisdiction pursuant to, among other things, the doctrine of forum non conveniens." 7 They
hoped to "defeat the presumption in favor of plaintiffs' choice of forum" by emphasizing
5 8
that relevant documents and witnesses were located in France.
First noting that a plaintiffs choice of jurisdiction is entitled to "significant deference,"
the court went on to discuss in general the possibility of an adequate alternative forum.'1 9
In this regard, defendants could not establish that an equivalent class action mechanism
exists under French law to provide plaintiffs with a similar redress.

150. See
id. at 1357.
151. Seeid. at 1363-64.
152. Id. at 1360.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1365.
155. Id.
156. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
157. See id. at 124.
158. Id. at 131.
159. See id. The court explained that it should "not dismiss a complaint brought by American plaintiffs in
favor of a foreign jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds unless trial in the United States is demonstrably
'unjust, vexatious, or oppressive' (citing Flynn v. General Motors, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 5, 8 (E.D.N.Y.1992)).
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While the possibility that the substantive law may be more favorable to the plaintiffs in the
current forum is not entitled to substantial weight in reviewing defendants' motion to dismiss,
the fact that there is not a functional equivalent in France of class-based 6judicial review
strengthens plaintiffs' claim that France is not an adequate alternative forum.
The court next addressed private and public interests in trial in the foreign forum and
ultimately decided that both factors-even if there were an adequate alternative forumweighed in favor of the U.S. court's continuing jurisdiction. Defendants' arguments about
cost were also disregarded because the court found that costs would be significantly mitigated by "time-and money-saving tools including e-mail, fax, scanners, digital photography,
6
and global access to the Internet." 1
In Parex Bank v. Russian Savings Bank, 16 the plaintiff was a financial institution organized
under the laws
and existing under the laws of Latvia. Defendant was a company organized
163
of the Russian federation, with its principle place of business in Moscow.
The court felt that the overriding question in deciding whether to dismiss a motion for
lack of personal jurisdiction was "'whether the convenience of the parties and the ends of
justice would best be served by dismissing the action.' While the plaintiffs choice of forum
is normally given 'substantial deference,' a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is given less
deference than that of a domestic plaintiff."164
In deciding whether there was an adequate alternative forum in which to adjudicate the
dispute, the court first affirmed the oft-cited principle that a foreign forum is not inadequate
merely because its justice system differs from that of the United States, and further that the
court should abstain from adversely judging the quality of Russia's justice system, unless
165
plaintiff makes a showing of inadequate procedural safeguards.
The court reflected on whether the Moscow City Arbitration Court-to the jurisdiction
of which both parties agreed they were subject-would permit a satisfactory remedy.'66 In
the end, this case turned on the fact that there was "no remedy at all." 167 The Supreme
Arbitration Tribunal of the Russian Federation recently held that the type of contracts at
issue are not enforceable under the Russian Civil Code. 6s The motion to dismiss for forum
non conveniens was thus denied.
2. State Developments
In American Cemwood Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,

69

the California court of

appeals held that a defendant seeking to remove a case to a more convenient forum must

160. Id. at 132 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 133.
162. Parex Bank v. Russian Say. Bank, 116 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
163. See id. The plaintiff sued in New York because defendant used accounts in a New York bank for the
transaction at issue. See id.
164. Id.at 423 (citations omitted).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 426-27. The issue was recently handed down by the highest court with jurisdiction over such

a case. See id.
169. American Cemwood Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

SUMMER 2001

512

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

show that all defendants may be served in the alternate forum. Specifically, the court addressed the issue of whether the moving defendant must show that there is an alternative
forum that has jurisdiction over all of the defendants110
Defendant argued that forum non conveniens was appropriate because all of the defendants could be sued in separate actions brought in different states. Plaintiff-appellants argued that that forum non conveniens is not available unless all defendants in the California
action could be compelled to litigate in one alternative forum, and the court agreed. 7'
In so holding, the court noted that a court's discretion "to decline to exercise its authorized jurisdiction over an action for considerations of convenience is limited by the
proviso that another forum must be available for the plaintiff's action."' The court further
noted that:
[a] rule permitting a stay or dismissal of an action over which no single alternative court could
exercise jurisdiction would force the plaintiff to pursue separate actions in multiple states or
countries to obtain complete relief. Such a rule, by encouraging piecemeal litigation and blossoming numbers of actions in multiple jurisdictions, would threaten precisely those considerations of convenience, economy and justice the doctrine was designed to bolster.7 3
IV. Choice of Law in International Litigation
A.

MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS: WHOSE LAW GOVERNS?

In BP Chemicals, Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corp., 74 a case involving an alleged
misappropriation of trade secrets, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
embarked upon a complex choice of law analysis on an issue-by-issue basis. The court
concluded that the law of the situs of the misappropriation, here Taiwan, should govern
the issues in question because a sovereign has a paramount interest in setting standards for
the protection of intellectual property within its own borders.' BP Chemicals, Ltd. (BP),
a British corporation, brought suit for misappropriation of trade secrets against Formosa
Chemical & Fibre Corporation (FCFC), a Taiwanese corporation, and Joseph Oat Corporation GOC), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey, under the Lanham Act, 76 the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property,'77 and NewJersey common law.
BP alleged that (1) FCFC had misappropriated certain trade secrets that BP's predecessor
had previously provided to a Taiwanese licensee; and (2) FCFC and JOC had entered into
a contract to produce certain vessels in New Jersey using misappropriated technical specifications for the construction of a plant in Taiwan.' BP sought a preliminary injunction
preventing JOC and FCFC from exporting the vessels from New Jersey to Taiwan, as well

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 674.
Seeid.
Id. at 675.
Id.
BP Chem., Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2000).

175. Seeid. at 265-66, 268.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h) (2001).
177. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 11851,
305-88.
178. See BP Chem., 229 F.3d at 257.
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as compensatory and punitive damages from FCFC. FCFC moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. ,79
The district court denied FCFC's motion to dismiss and, applying NewJersey law, ruled
that BP had demonstrated its entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief against FCFC and
JOC. 8s FCFC and JOC appealed, and BP cross-appealed."' The court of appeals reversed
the lower court's order, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over
FCFC.'82 More significantly for purposes of this discussion, the appellate court held that
the district court had concluded incorrectly that New Jersey had the most significant relationship to the issues presented and had erroneously applied New Jersey law to the "likelihood of success on the merits" inquiry. s3
In performing its choice of law analysis, the court ofappeals applied NewJersey's "flexible
'governmental-interest analysis,"' under which "the determinative law is that of the state
with the greatest interest in governing the particularissue to be decided."'' s4 The court of
appeals consulted New Jersey case law and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
to conclude that under New Jersey choice of law rules, choice-of-law decisions should be
conducted on an "issue-by-issue basis."' Since the inquiry into whether BP was "likely
to succeed on the merits" involved multiple issues, the problem before the court was to
determine which law applied to each of these issues. 86
The court of appeals determined that JOC's objection to the district court's application
of New Jersey law over Taiwanese law was limited to two specific issues: (1) whether BP
had a protectable interest in its proprietary information; and (2) whether FCFC tortiously
acquired BP's trade secret. 87 The court reviewed conflicting expert affidavits submitted by
BP and JOC on the question of whether there was a true conflict between Taiwanese and
New Jersey laws on these two issues.,8 The court decided that JOC's introduction of evidence of a possible conflict of laws into the record, notwithstanding BP's evidence to the
contrary, was sufficient to warrant a choice of law analysis to determine whether Taiwan or
New Jersey had the more substantial interest in having its law apply to the two issues in
question. 18 9
With respect to the first issue, the court determined that Taiwan had a substantial interest
in whether BP had a protectable interest in the proprietary information because a sovereign
has a significant interest in setting standards for the protection of intellectual property
within its own borders. '- ° In contrast, the court concluded that New Jersey's interest ap-

179. Seeid.
180. See id. at 257, 264.
181. See id. at 257.
182. Seeid. at 259-63, 268.
183. Id. at 264.
184. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 264 (quoting O'Connor v. Busch Gardens, 605 A.2d 773, 774 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)).
186. Id. at 264.
187. Seeid.
188. See id. at 265.
189. See id. The appellate court specifically did not conclude whether a true conflict of laws existed, but left
that determination for the district court ultimately to decide. See id. at 268.
190. See id. at 265-66. The court went on to doubt that a New Jersey court would apply New Jersey law in
this case even if BP were a New Jersey corporation. See id. at 266. "A state's interest in protecting its citizens
from injury by protecting intellectual property which they choose to license to foreign companies cannot
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191
peared to be "virtually nil."'
Significantly, the court found instructive the reasoning of the
New Jersey Superior Court's decision in O'Connorv. Busch Gardens.192 In that case, the New
Jersey court concluded that it would be "an impermissible intrusion into the affairs of other
states" to apply NewJersey's comparative negligence doctrine in a case where a NewJersey
plaintiff, who was partially at fault, had been injured in Virginia-a state that follows the
strict rule of common-law contributory negligence. 193 Applying the state court's reasoning
to the case before it, the federal court of appeals stated that "neither New Jersey nor Great
Britain's concern for their injured citizens [could] outweigh Taiwan's interest in setting
94
standards for the protection of intellectual property in Taiwan."
With respect to the second issue, the court of appeals likewise concluded that Taiwan
had the greater interest in having its law apply to determine whether FCFC, a Taiwanese
company, had acted tortiously in acquiring information in Taiwan from a Taiwanese licensee
of BP's predecessor. This was particularly so because this inquiry would involve a determination of the circumstances under which a Taiwanese company's actions create a duty of
confidentiality in its employees.' 91 The court concluded that, "any interest that NewJersey
would have in protecting trade secret holders who export their intellectual property to
Taiwan is greatly outweighed by Taiwan's interest in setting the standards that govern
the conduct of its own citizens regarding intellectual property that is present within its
96
borders."1
The court of appeals drew upon the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in support
of its conclusion that Taiwanese law applied to the two issues at hand. 197 In particular, the
court looked to the commentary to Section 145 of the Restatement, which states that the
place of injury is less important in cases of misappropriation of trade values than it is in
other tort contexts: "the principal location of the defendant's conduct is the contact that
will usually be given the greatest weight in determining the state whose local law determines
the rights and liabilities that arise."'' 9 The court of appeals applied the reasoning of the
Restatement and determined that the "vast majority of the conduct that is relevant to these
two issues occurred in Taiwan" and that BP and JOC, although not Taiwanese themselves,
had established significant relationships with Taiwan. 199
Accordingly, the court of appeals set aside the injunction entered by the district court
and directed that court to conduct further proceedings with respect to BP's claim against
JOC in accordance with the higher court's choice of law analysis. 2°° Notably, CircuitJudge
Alito specifically declined to join in the court's conclusions as to choice of law for the reason

outweigh the interests of the foreign sovereign in setting the standards for the protection of intellectual property
within its own borders." Id. at 266.
191. Id at 266. BP was not a resident of New Jersey, and Great Britain (not New Jersey) was the alleged
principal situs of the injury. See id. at 266 n.4. None of the parties argued that English law governed any of
the issues presented. See id. at 266 n.4.
192. O'Connor v. Busch Gardens, 605 A.2d 773 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
193. Id. at 775.
194. BP Chem., 229 F.3d at 266.
195. Seeid.
196. Id.
197. See id. The court remarked that "New Jersey courts have often looked [to
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS]

for guidance." Id.

198. Id. at 267 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
199. Id. at267-68.
200. See id. at 268 n.6.
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that he did not think the choice of law question was properly before the court: "Without
full briefing from the parties, I am unwilling to join the court's novel application of New
Jersey choice-of-law principles. 210'
B.

SELECTION OF CHOICE OF

LAw

RULES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) °2 waives sovereign immunity and grants district
courts jurisdiction over tort claims against the United States "under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordancewith the
°4
0
law of the place where the act or omission occurred." In Gould Electronics,Inc. v. United States,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted a largely undeveloped area of
the law, namely how to determine which state's conflict of laws rules apply in FTCA cases
involving multiple alleged "acts or omissions" occurring in more than one state.
The federal court of appeals in Gould consulted the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Richards v. United States, 5 and determined that "[w]hen a case involves multiple alleged
acts or omissions occurring in more than one state, the FTCA, as construed by Richards,
requires the district court to engage in a complex conflict of laws analysis to determine
which state law governs the jurisdictional inquiry. 20 6 The court adopted the Supreme
Court's interpretation that the "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred"
means the "whole law" of the state, including that state's choice of law rules.57 The court
then proceeded to identify "a two step choice of law analysis" in FTCA cases where multiple
acts or omissions have occurred in more than one state: first, the court must select between
the respective choice of law rules of the states where an act or omission occurred;2 0° second,
the court must apply that state's choice of law rules to determine which state's substantive
tort law should apply.2H9
The Gould court acknowledged that the analysis required in the first step of the choice
of law inquiry was "largely undeveloped," and so proceeded to examine "five approaches"
articulated by various other courts. 1 0 While the facts in Gould did not require the court to
201. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
202. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 etseq.
203. Id. § 1346(b) (emphasis added).
204. Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2000). Gould involved a complaint against
the United States for contribution and indemnity. The plaintiffs/appellants Gould Electronics, Inc. and American Premier Underwriters, Inc., were co-defendants in a toxic tort case arising out of personal injuries and
property damage allegedly caused by air and water pollution from a battery manufacturing plant in New York.
The plant was designed, constructed, owned and operated by the United States Army, and was owned and
operated by plaintiffs/appellants, and their predecessors, at various times. The plaintiffs/appellants brought the
contribution and indemnity suit against the United States following their settlement of toxic tort claims brought
against them. See id. at 173.
205. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
206. Gould, 220 F.3d at 179.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 180. In Gould, multiple acts or omissions were alleged to have occurred in New York and Pennsylvania, therefore, the court had to select between the choice of law rules of these two states.
209. See id. In Gould, the substantive laws of four different states were potentially applicable: New York
(where the acts or omissions occurred), Pennsylvania (same), Ohio (domicile of plaintiffs/appellants), and the
District of Columbia (possible domicile of the United States).
210. Neither the text of the FTCA nor Ricbards provides any guidance on how to choose between conflicting
choice of law rules when the alleged acts or omissions occur in more than one state. Moreover, the
legislative history of the FTCA sheds no light on this problem. The selection of what choice of law
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adopt definitively one specific approach, 2" the court outlined effectively the relevant analytical framework.
In Kohn v. United States," 2 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
articulated the first approach identified in Gould.In Kohn, the relevant injury could be parsed
3
according to the acts or omissions occurring in various states." Accordingly, the Kohn court
applied the choice of law rules "on an act-by-act basis, applying the relevant state's choice
14
of law rules for each act or omission." Because the plaintiffs' injuries in Gould were
"indivisible" the court determined this first approach to be "unworkable.""'
In Bowen v. United States,2 6 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit outlined both
the second and third approaches identified in Gould. The Bowen court held that "the court
should elect the choice of law rules of 'the place of the last act or omission having a causal
2 7
effect' or 'the place of the act or omission having the most significant causal effect."' '
While "expressing a preference" for the latter approach, the Bowen court ultimately did not
select one approach over the other because both the last act having causal effect and the
2
act with the most significant causal effect occurred in the same state."' The Gould court
applied this approach to the facts before it and concluded that both the second and third
29
approaches pointed to an application of New York choice of law rules. '
22
In Ducey v. United States,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit articulated the
fourth approach identified in Gould, which looks to the choice of law rules of "the state in
which 'physical acts' could have prevented the injury."2'' In Ducey, the court selected Nevada
choice of law rules "because the injury could have been prevented by physical acts in Ne'
The court of appeals in Gould adopted this reasoning again to conclude that New
vada."222
York choice of law rules would apply.223

Finally, in Hitchcock v. United States, 2 4 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia articulated the fifth approach identified in Gould. In Hitchcock, the court applied
the choice of law rules of the District of Columbia because that was where "the 'relevant'
act or omission (had] occurred."" 5 Applying this approach, the court of appeals in Gould
concluded that the "relevant acts" occurred in New York and, therefore, the fifth approach
likewise pointed to an application of New York's choice of law rules.

rules to apply at the first step of the analysis has been largely undeveloped. However, where courts
have spoken, they have adopted five approaches.
Gould, 220 F.3d at 181.
211. The first approach was unworkable in this case, and the remaining four resulted in identical outcomes.
See id. at 182.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Kohn v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
See Gould, 220 F.3d at 181 (discussingKobn, 591 F. Supp. at 572).
Id. (discussing same).
Id. at 182.
Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
Gould, 220 F.3d at 182 (quoting Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318).
Id. (discussing same).
See id.
Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1983).
Gould, 220 F.3d at 183 (quoting Ducey, 713 F.2d at 509 n.2).
Id. (discussing same).
Seeid.
Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Gould, 220 F.3d at 182 (quoting Hitchcock, 665 F.2d at 359).
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While dismissing the first approach as "unworkable" in light of the facts in Gould, the
court of appeals elected not to adopt any one of the remaining four approaches, because
"each (led] to the application of New York choice of law rules."226 Neither did the court
state a preference for any particular approach. Rather, the court proceeded directly to step
two of its inquiry and applied New York's choice of law rules to conclude that Ohio's
substantive law applied to plaintiffs' contribution claim.2
C.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AS AN ASPECT OF Loss-ALLOCATION

In Caruolo v. John Crane,Inc.,22 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
confronted an ill-defined area of New York law concerning New York's choice of law rules
pertaining to prejudgment interest computations. The federal court of appeals reconciled
three prior federal and state cases addressing New York choice of law rules in this area, and
held that New York law treats prejudgment interest like all other loss-allocating damages
issues.229
In Caruolo,the federal district court had ruled that Rhode Island law applied to the issue
of joint and several liability and New York law applied to the computation of prejudgment
interest.230 On appeal, the court reviewed the lower court's choice of law determinations de
novo and upheld that court's application of the second Neumeier choice of law rule, as well
as its subsequent application of the law of Rhode Island to the issue of joint and several
liability."'
In contrast, the court of appeals disagreed substantially with the reasoning of the district
court on the issue of prejudgment interest, and reversed its application of New York law to
that question.23 ' The district court had relied on a Second Circuit case, Entron, Inc. v.
Affiliated FMInsurance Co.,2 3 to support its application of New York law to the computation
of prejudgment interest. Entron provides that the law of the state "whose law determined

226. Id. at 183.
227. Id. It should be noted that the court engaged in a complex choice of law analysis under New York law
that entailed an application of the Neumeier rules (discussed infra note 231), as well as close examination of
difficult questions concerning the proper domicile of the United States and the circumstances under which
courts are wont to displace the locus law with domiciliary law. Id. at 183-91.
228. Caruolo v. John Crane, Inc., 226 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2000). Caruolo concerns an appeal by a manufacturer
and distributor of sealing devices containing asbestos from a personal injury judgment in favor of plaintiffs,
Paul and Mary Caruolo, following a jury trial. See id. at 49-51.
229. Id. at 59 (discussing Entron, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 749 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1984), Schultz
v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985), and Schwimmer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 648 (2d Cir.
1999)).
230. Id. at 50 (citing Caruolo v. AC&S, Inc., 1998 WL 730331, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
231. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972), appeal after remand 349 N.Y.S 2d 866 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973). Neumeier established three choice of law rules in the context of guest-statutes, which rules
have since been applied to other loss-allocation conflicts. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480
N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). For a comprehensive discussion of the Neumeier rules and the scope of their allocation,
see EUGENE F. SCOLES
ET AL.,CONFLICT OFLAws §§ 17.30-17.32 (3d ed. 2000). The second Neumeier rule, as
articulated by the court of appeals in Caruolo, provides that, "if the parties are domiciliaries of different states,
and the accident occurs in one of the domiciliary states, the law of that state should be applied in the absence
of special circumstances." 226 F.3d at 57. The plaintiffs in Caruolo were domiciled in Rhode Island and Paul
Caruolo's most significant exposure to asbestos was deemed to have occurred in Rhode Island. Id. at 57-58.
232. Carulo, 226 F.3d at 57-59.
233. Entron, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1984).
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34
liability on the main claim" governs an award of prejudgment interest. The court of
appeals, on the other hand, relied on a post-Entron decision of the New York Court of
Appeals, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.,35 to support the application of Rhode Island
law to the question of prejudgment interest. In Schultz, the New York Court of Appeals
"drew a relevant distinction between rules in conflict that are 'loss allocating' and those
that are 'conduct regulating,"' and extended the former to include charitable immunity
rules. 36 The Schultz court characterized loss-allocating rules as "all shar[ing] the characteristic of being post-event remedial rules designed to allocate the burden of losses resulting
from tortious conduct in which the jurisdiction of the parties' common domicile has a
paramount interest."2" ' The federal court of appeals in Caruolo adopted this analysis to
extend loss-allocating rules to include prejudgment interest computations. 38
To arrive at its conclusion, however, the Caruolo court had to distinguish its own very
recent decision in Schwimmer v. Allstate Insurance Co., 39 in which it had cited Entron with
favor and reiterated that case's holding.14° The court explained the distinction as follows:

Schwimmer's holding turned on: (i) the defendant's consent to the application of New York law
to the determination of liability; and (ii) the defendant's "fail[ure] to bring to the attention of
the district court the potential applicability of Florida law to the issue of prejudgment interest."
Given the defendant's waiver, the court in Schwimmer had no opportunity to consider whether,
law, prejudgment interest should be treated like all other loss-allocating
under New York
241
damages issues.
The court went on to address the precise question that the Schwimmer court had not had
the opportunity to consider, and concluded that "New York law, as articulated in Schultz,
requires that the same analysis applicable to joint and several liability, and other lossallocating issues, also be applied to calculate the prejudgment interest. 2 42 Accordingly, the
court overturned the district court's application of New York law over Rhode Island law to
234. Id. at 131.
235. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985).
236. Caruolo, 226 F.3d at 59 (citing Schultz, 491 N.Y.2d at 198-99). In Schultz, the New York Court of
Appeals analyzed the relative interest of the domicile and locus jurisdictions in having their laws apply in
connection with "conduct regulating" and "loss allocating" rules respectively. The court concluded that the
locus jurisdiction has a greater interest in having its law apply to conduct regulating conflicts, whereas
the domicile jurisdiction has a greater interest in having its law apply to loss allocating conflicts:
[W]hen the conflicting rules involve the appropriate standards of conduct ...the law of the place of the
tort "will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern"... because the locus jurisdiction's interests
in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on it to govern their primary conduct
and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future assume critical
importance and outweigh any interests of the common-domicile jurisdiction . . . Conversely, when the
jurisdictions' conflicting rules relate to allocating losses that result from admittedly tortious conduct,...
[a]nalysis ...favors the jurisdiction of common domicile because of its interest in enforcing the decisions
of both parties to accept both the benefits and the burdens of identifying with that jurisdiction and to
submit themselves to its authority.
Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 198 (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 199.
238. Caruolo, 226 F.3d at 59.
239. Schwimmerv. Allstate Ins. Co.,176 F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1999).
240. Id. at 650 ("Under New York choice of law rules, the law of the jurisdiction that determines liability
governs theaward of prejudgment interest." (citing Entron, 749 F.2d at 131)).
241. Caruolo, 226 F.3d at 59 (quoting Schwimmer, 176 F.3d at 650).
242. Id.
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the issue of prejudgment interest, vacated the prejudgment interest award and remanded
43
for recalculation in accordance with Rhode Island law3
V. Discovery
A.

INTRODUCTION

In U.S. federal courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1784 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
govern international discovery practices. The 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters2" and other treaties may apply in both
state and federal courts when witnesses or other sources of potential evidence reside in
countries that are parties to treaties the United States has ratified. The seminal case discussing the interplay of federal rules and international treaties in discovery matters is Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U. S. District Court.24" That case held that a trial court
could apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than the strict procedures that
implement the Hague Convention, though this should be done carefully to take into account the principles that underlie the Convention.
B.

OBTAINING

U.S.

DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN DISPUTES

1. Eleventh CircuitDenies Attempted Use of Hague Convention to Obtain Discovery of U.S.
CriminalProceedingsfor Defense of CriminalAction in England
In a somewhat novel situation, two defendants in a criminal proceeding pending in England sought documents and other information gathered and generated during a related
criminal investigation in the U.S. The court in United Kingdom v. United Statesa " held that
the Hague Convention did not extend beyond civil matters. Because defendants sought
information from a U.S. criminal matter, the Hague Convention did not provide any basis
for such discovery.
The defendants in this case faced criminal charges in England relating to an alleged credit
card fraud scheme.247 The indictment in England charged defendants with obtaining American Express card numbers from American co-conspirators and using those fraudulently
obtained credit card numbers for purchases in England. The discovery sought by the defendants consisted of information generated in U.S. criminal investigations ofthe American
co-conspirators. 48 The defendants obtained letters rogatory from the English court asking
assistance in obtaining designated information from the related U.S. criminal investigation.
The purported basis of the requests was that this information could be of assistance in
249
defending against the English charges.
Rejecting defendants' argument that the Hague Convention applied, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that "[t]he materials at issue here are sought for use in a criminal proceeding; the

243. See id.
244. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, openedfor signature
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
245. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U. S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
246. United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
247. See id. at 1314.
248. See id. at 1314-15.
249. See id.at 1315.
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Convention, by contrast, by its terms applies only to civil and commercial matters." 50 The
Court also rejected defendants' contention that because the letter requests involved "discovery" and/or related "commercial transactions," the Hague Convention should be applied. The Court noted that such an interpretation could render the Convention "potentially applicable in all disputes, not merely civil or commercial cases." ''
The Court also affirmed the district court's decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 not to
provide the assistance requested in the letters rogatory. As the Court noted, a district court
has wide discretion under § 1782 in deciding whether to assist a foreign court in obtaining
information in the U.S., and a district court's decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The Court found no abuse because the documents in question implicated
both issues of privilege and statutory non-disclosure requirements," 2 and it held that the
district court properly weighed these issues against the need for the disclosure and the
possible relevance of the evidence.2 53
C.

OBTAINING DISCOVERY FOR U.S. COURT PROCEEDINGS

1. District Courts Permit Discoveryfrom Foreign Defendantsfor Purposesof Resolving
JurisdictionIssues
Recently, federal district courts sitting in Washington, D.C. and New York considered
whether to permit discovery from foreign defendants relating to whether the court has
jurisdiction over them. In resolving the issue in the affirmative, both of these decisions
54
relied upon the considerations established in Aerospatiale.
In In re VitaminsAntitrust Litigation,"' plaintiffs sought discovery from foreign defendants
concerning an alleged price-fixing scheme. While plaintiffs' original requests went beyond
jurisdictional issues, a special master narrowed the requests to matters necessary to resolve
56
the jurisdictional issues.1
The Court first addressed whether Aerospatiale applied. (If it did not, of course, the
plaintiffs would have to use the Hague Convention to obtain discovery regarding jurisdiction over the defendants.) Defendants argued that it did not because Aerospatiale involved
a case where personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants was not at issue. The Court
acknowledged that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any circuit court had addressed
the issue." 7
Defendants argued that compliance with the Hague Convention was more important in
jurisdictional discovery than where jurisdiction is not at issue. The Court rejected this
argument by noting that a trial court clearly has "jurisdiction to determine its jurisdic-

250. Id.
at 1318.
251. Id.
252. Most of the documents sought by defendants either were used as evidence in grand jury proceedings
that are subject to strict statutory safeguards against disclosure or were generated by U.S. investigative personnel
and, thus, subject to claims of attorney-client privilege and/or work-product.

253. See
United Kingdom,238 F.3d at 1318-1320.
254. Societe NationaleIndstrielleAerospatiale,482 U.S. 522 (1987).
255. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp.2d 45 (U.S.D.D.C. 2000).
256. See id. at 48. The Court's opinion affirmed and adopted a report and recommendation by the special
master permitting discovery into jurisdictional issues that included, among other things, narrowly tailoring

plaintiffs' original discovery requests to the fundamental personal jurisdiction issue.
257. See id.
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tion." 58 Thus, the Court concluded that interests ofcomity did not militate against applying
the discretion afforded courts in Aerospatiale and cited several federal district court decisions
from other jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion.
At bottom, the Court rejected defendants' premise that permitting jurisdictional discovery pursuant to Aerospatiale (i.e., not necessarily according to the Convention) would somehow be more threatening to a foreign nation's sovereignty than using that same analysis
after jurisdiction had been established. In doing so, the Court noted that the foreign nations
involved in this case also prohibit the sort of price-fixing alleged in the case, and that
defendants had already admitted to involvement in the conspiracy.25 9 Applying the Aerospatiale balancing test, the Court concluded that defendants had to respond to the narrowly
tailored discovery requests notwithstanding the Convention, because "the information
sought is crucial to resolution of this issue and thus to the prompt conclusion of this antitrust
action." 60 The Court also based its decision on the special master's finding that resort to
Hague Convention procedures "would be extremely unlikely to provide efficient and effective discovery in this case."2 6 1 Accordingly, the Court ordered the foreign defendants to
comply with the discovery requests to resolve the fimdamental question of whether the
Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over them.
Addressing a similar issue, the Court in Dietrichv. Bauere62 enforced plaintiff's subpoena
for documents from a non-party foreign bank. The case involved claims of fraudulent securities transactions effectuated by laundering money through accounts of foreign banks.
Plaintiff issued a subpoena to Allied Irish Bank (AIB) asking for records relating to any of
the transactions at issue. The subpoena included a request for documents located in "AIB's
2 63
branch located in Uxbridge, Middlesex, Great Britain."
AIB objected to the subpoena on the ground that the Court did not have jurisdiction
over AIB, except its New York branch. Because the subpoena was issued to AIB in Ireland,
AB argued that the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the foreign operation prevented enforcement of the subpoena. AIB also argued that its New York branch did not have "control"
over any records in its Uxbridge branch within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governing subpoenas. 64
Adopting the position that personal jurisdiction over AIB was necessary before applying
the Aerospatiale balancing test (a position rejected in the In re Vitamins Litigation discussed
above), the Court first addressed AIB's claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce
the subpoena. The Court concluded that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over AIB
because AIB conducted business in New York through its New York branch office. 26 The
Court also concluded that AIB had "control" over the records requested because the documents and information sought were in the possession of its English branch. 66

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 49.
See id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Dietrich v. Bauer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11729 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at *3-4. Plaintiff did not sue Allied Irish Bank (MIB) and, thus, AIB was not a party to the action.
See id. at *2-3.
See id. at *11-12.
See id. at *13-14.
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Having established personal jurisdiction over AIB and having concluded that AIB had
"control" over the documents sought, the Court addressed AIB's claim that plaintiff was
required to pursue the requested information through the Hague Convention. The Court
noted that under Aerospatiale, the Hague Convention is "neither the exclusive, nor even
necessarily the first, means for obtaining discovery from a foreign entity, as compared with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."267 Pointing out that defendants had not made any
showing with respect to the considerations established in Aerospatiale, such as comity, the
Court held that nothing prevented plaintiff from pursuing the information from AIB
26
through a subpoena issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
2. FederalDistrict Court Orders U.S. Style Deposition Instead of Witness ExaminationPursuant
to the Hague Convention
In Madanes v. Madanes,26 defendants sought a protective order from certain Letters of
Request"70 seeking examination of witnesses in Argentina pursuant to the Hague Convention. The plaintiff wanted to examine witnesses concerning an alleged misappropriation of
trust funds that occurred, in part, in Argentina. The defendants opposed the discovery on
the ground that it would create a risk that privileged information would be disclosed. The
defendants had previously produced certain information pursuant to a protective order put
in place by the court. Under Hague Convention procedures the information would be
disclosed in a context jeopardizing these protections. Defendants offered to conduct a
"western style" deposition in private. 27'
The Court resolved the dispute by permitting examination of the witnesses, but under a
traditional U.S.-type of private deposition. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that
pursuant to Aerospatiale, the Hague Convention is neither the exclusive, nor necessarily the
first, means to resolve the issue. Rather, the Court must look to several factors in light of
the facts of the case, including "comity, the relative interests of the parties including the
interest in avoiding abusive discovery, and the ease and efficiency of alternative formats for
discovery." 2 2 Applying those considerations to the particular facts of the case, the Court
concluded that "considerations of comity do not favor use of Hague Convention procedures," because the case involved only private parties and defendants did not seek to limit
73
disclosure; rather, they only challenged the forum in which disclosures would occur.
Balancing these factors against plaintiffs minimal interest in an examination format (the
court noted that under either format defendants would be sworn to an oath of truthfulness),
the Court concluded that examination of the witnesses should proceed in a private deposition format.114

267. Id. at *15.
268. See id. at 15-16.
269. Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
270. A Letter of Request under the Convention requires, among other things, that the requesting party
specify (a) the authority making the request; (b) the description of the proceedings including the names and
addresses of the parties involved; and (c) the questions to be asked and/or the documents or other property to
be inspected. These are the primary elements of a Letter of Request under Article 3 of the Convention.
271. See Madanes, 195 F.R.D. at 140. The opinion suggests that plaintiff's demand for a more public examination under the Hague Convention was based on plaintiff's belief that such a forum would provide greater
assurance of cooperation and truthfulness by defendants.
272. Id. at 141.
273. Id.
274. See id.
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Vi. Personal Jurisdiction
A.

JURISDICTION OVER PARENT CORPORATION BASED UPON CONDUCT OF SUBSIDIARY

Courts continued to reach varying results when the issue is whether a parent company
could be subjected to personal jurisdiction based on the acts of its subsidiary. In general,
jurisdiction is more likely to be found in tort cases, especially when the claim is for a tort
arising out of the sale of the parent's product in the forum state.
1. Pension Fund Liability
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp,275
involved a Canadian parent corporation's liability under ERISA resulting from the withdrawal of its subsidiary, ICTL, from a multi-employer pension fund when the subsidiary
ceased operations. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1), businesses under common control
are jointly and severally liable for actuarial deficits when one withdraws from a pension
fund. The plaintiff pension fund had already obtained an unsatisfied judgment against
ICTL. It then sued ICTL's parent, REE, and another affiliate, RECW, in federal court in
Illinois, where ICTL had been headquartered before it ceased operations.
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the court of
appeals affirmed. The court first held that service of process in Canada was effective notwithstanding ERISA's provision in for service "in any district. '' 7 6 Overruling precedent
interpreting an earlier version of Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2"
the court held that the Rule now authorizes extraterritorial service of process on a federal
claim unless prohibited (expressly or by clear implication) by another federal statute.27 s
The court held that ERISA's imposition of withdrawal liability on affiliates could not
impose personal jurisdiction on them. Rather, for jurisdiction to exist, the affiliates themselves must have minimum contacts sufficient to comport with due process.279 In so holding,
the court expressly rejected the argument that personal jurisdiction existed because REE
and RECW should have anticipated being sued in the United States based upon the statutorily created liability.
The court then applied something approximating an "alter ego" analysis, holding that
"constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially
observed and the parent does not exercise an unusually high degree of control over the
subsidiary."'28 0 REE's provision of administrative services to subsidiaries in return for fees
did not meet this test.2"' Furthermore, the activities of ICTL in the United States were
irrelevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction over its affiliates."2

275. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp, 230 F.3d
934 (7th Cir. 2000).
276. 29 U.S.C. § 145 1(d).
277. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
278. See Central States, 230 F.3d at 941-42.
279. See id. at 943-45.
280. Id. at 943.
281. See id. at 938-39.
282. See id. at 946.
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Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the pension fund's request for
discovery on the issue of jurisdiction.2 83 It held that, to be entitled to such discovery, the
plaintiff must first "show a colorable basis for jurisdiction," which it had not done1 s4 The
court agreed that the discovery requested was overly broad and largely irrelevant, but also
held that the district court's refusal to permit even more narrowly targeted discovery was
not an abuse of discretion. s5
2. PatentInfringement and Product Liability
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp1 s 6 was a patent infringement action against a
Japanese corporation, YEC, and its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, YEA. YEA is based in
Illinois, and its sole business is to import YEC products from Japan and resell them in the
United States. Kollmorgen, which is based in Virginia, sued YEA and YEC for patent
infringement in federal court in Virginia, where YEA had made sales. YEC moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying the test established by the Federal Circuit in 3D
Systems, Inc. v. Aarotecb Lab.," s7 the district court denied the motion. That test, which applies
in patent cases in all circuits, requires an analysis of whether the defendant purposefully
directed activities giving rise to the claim at residents of the forum state and whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable and fair. YEA admittedly met this test,
but YEC contended that YEA was in charge of all marketing activities in the U.S., and
YEC was unaware of the states in which its products were resold. The court rejected this
argument, holding that because YEC and YEA "acted in consort" in distributing YEC's
products in the United States, YEC was subject to jurisdiction wherever YEA sold infringing products, regardless of whether YEC directed or controlled the ultimate destination.
In addition to YEA's exclusive relationship with YEC, the court found that extensive information about YEC's products on YEA's website, obviously provided by YEC, helped
demonstrate the concerted action.
Wise v. McNeil PharmaceuticaPss reached a similar result in a product liability case. In a
somewhat abbreviated opinion, the court held that an Italian pharmaceutical manufacturer
whose drug is distributed in the United States by an independent company was subject to
personal jurisdiction in Illinois. It sufficed that the distributor directed some marketing
efforts at Illinois, regardless of whether the manufacturer was aware of the specific states
in which the drug was sold.
B.

JURISDICTION BASED UPON USE OF LOCAL BANK

ACCOUNTS

In Georgia-PacificCorp. v. Multimark's Int'l,2 89 the plaintiff was a Georgia corporation
based in Georgia that sold goods to defendant Multimark's, a British Virgin Islands corporation, for resale in Latin America. When Multimark's did not pay for the goods,
Georgia-Pacific brought suit in New York and attached Multimark's bank account there.

283. Seeid. at 947.

284. Id.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Seeid.
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572 (W.D. Va. 1999).
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Lab., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Wise v. McNeil Pharm., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2219 (N.D. 111.2000).
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Multimark's Int'l, 706 N.Y.S.2d 82 (2000).
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That account had insufficient funds, however, and it appeared that Multimark's had instructed customers to make payments directly to the bank account of its parent, Republican
Ltd., a Panamanian corporation. As a consequence, Georgia Pacific added Republican as a
defendant and successfully attached its New York bank account, alleging that Republican
was the alter ego ofMultimark's and conspired with it to evade the attachment. Republican,
which had no employees or operations in New York, moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied this motion, and the appellate division affirmed. The appellate
court found that Republican "admittedly use[d] an account at Bank Audi in New York to
receive payments for those products and to pay its suppliers."2 The court held that this
was sufficient to subject Republican to general personal jurisdiction in New York. 291 Accordingly, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether jurisdiction could arise based
upon the alter ego issue.
C. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES

In S. & Davis Int'l,Inc. v. Republic of Yemen,292 the Yemen General Corporation for Foreign
Trade and Grains had made a contract to purchase wheat from S & Davis, an Alabama
corporation. When the price of wheat dropped, the General Corporation breached the
contract by failing to establish a letter of credit, apparently at the direction of the Yemeni
Ministry of Supply and Trade. S & Davis initiated arbitration in London, pursuant to the
contract, and was awarded approximately $17 million in damages. It then brought suit in
federal court in Alabama to enforce the arbitral award. In that suit, S & Davis also sued the
Republic of Yemen for breach of contract and enforcement of the arbitral award, and alternatively for damages from the Ministry for tortious interference with contract. The
district court denied the Ministry's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed. Following Creighton Ltd. v. Qatar,93 it held that, because
the Ministry is an agent or instrumentality of the government of Yemen, the arbitration
exception of the FSIA, 29 conferred subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral
award.29 Furthermore, entering into the contract to purchase grain constituted commercial
activity under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), subjecting the Ministry to subject matter jurisdiction
with respect to the contract claim196
On the subject of personal jurisdiction, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether
the Fifth Amendment's due process clause applied to foreign governments.2 97 This was
because, unlike in Creighton, the transaction involved sufficient contacts with the United
States to satisfy due process requirements. Specifically, S & Davis was not merely based in
the U.S., but the contract called for the purchase of U.S. wheat, the posting of a letter of
credit with a U.S. bank, and, implicitly, shipment from the United States. 98
In Parex Bank v. Russian Savings Bank,299 the suit involved a nondeliverable forward exchange contract (NDF), a form of hedging device, for Russian rubles. Parex, a Latvian
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 83.
See id.
S. & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (1 Ith Cit. 2000).
Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B).
See S. & Davis Int'l,218 F.3d at 1301-02.
See id. at 1302-03.
See id. at 1303-04.
See id. at 1304-05.
Parex Bank v. Russian Say. Bank, 116 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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bank, sued Russian Savings Bank (Sberbank), an instrumentality of the government of Russia, in New York for breach of the NDE Although all negotiations were conducted in Latvia
and Russia, New York bank accounts were used to handle performance. Parex made a
security deposit into Sberbank's account with the Bank of New York, and settlement was
to be made by a transfer into either Parex's or Sberbank's Bank of New York account,
according to the future value of the ruble.
The court first held that the NDF was "commercial activity" falling within 28 U.S.C.
3°°
§ 1605(a)(2), because it had a "direct effect" in the United States. Noting without deciding, that the exercise of personal jurisdiction "might also have to meet constitutional due
process requirements," the court found that the use of the Bank of New York accounts in
this transaction and Sberbank's practice of conducting similar currency transactions
through the use of New York banks sufficed.3 0
D.

JURISDICTION BASED UPON PROVISION OF MISINFORMATION

32
Associated Transport Line, Inc. v. Productos FitosanitariosProficol El Carmnen, 0 involved an
unusual claim for partial reimbursement of clean-up costs incurred under CERCLA. Defendant Proficol, a Colombian corporation, contracted with plaintiff to ship herbicide from
Columbia to Trinidad, knowing that the ship would first make stops in the United States,
including Florida. The herbicide leaked while in Florida waters, requiring Transport to
clean it up. Transport contacted Proficol in Colombia to request information about the
compound. Proficol allegedly misrepresented the herbicide as a far more dangerous chemical, a consequence of which was that Transport unnecessarily used very costly clean-up
procedures. Transport sued Proficol for damages in Florida.
The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the court of appeals
affirmed. Transport did not claim that Proficol negligently caused the spill and, as a result,
had no claim against Proficol under CERCLA. °3 The court then held that because the
claim was for the state-law tort of negligent misrepresentation, the Florida long-arm statute
applied and would authorize jurisdiction over Proficol only if it committed the tort in
Florida. Proficol provided the alleged misinformation by telephone from Colombia, which
is where the tort occurred. The excess clean-up costs were not sufficient under Florida law
to make Florida the situs of the tort.
The court based its decision as to specific (transaction-based) jurisdiction on Florida law.
It did not perform a minimum-contacts analysis to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would have been constitutional. The court noted that Proficol's 193 purchases
from and nine sales to the United States during a four-year period were not sufficiently
pervasive to subject it to general personal jurisdiction, i.e., to jurisdiction on claims not
arising out of those specific transactions.' 4

300. Id.at 420.
301. Id. at 422.
302. Associated Trans. Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen, 197 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.
1999).
303. Seeid. at 1074. The court noted that Proficol might have been subject to jurisdiction had there been a
claim against it for improper disposal under CERCLA, but did not decide the issue because it was not presented.
304. See id. at 1074-75.
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JURISDICTION IN INTERNET CASES

One noteworthy case concerning personal jurisdiction over a foreign party involved the
Internet. In addition, a Ninth Circuit case involving a domain name challenge is particularly
significant because it allows plaintiffs to sue in their home state when a company contests
their use of an Internet domain name.
1. Domain Name Challenge
In Bancroft &Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National,Inc.,3u5 plaintiff Bancroft & Masters (B&M)
was a small California software company that maintained a website with the domain name
<masters.com>, which it had registered with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) in 1995. Defendant Augusta National (ANI) was a Georgia-based golf club that sponsors the annual
PGA Masters Tournament. ANI had several federally registered trademarks for the mark
"Masters" and operated a website under the name <masters.org>, which also was registered
with NSI.
In 1997, ANI sent a letter to NSI in Virginia challenging B&M's use of the domain name
<masters.com> as infringing ANI's trademarks. ANI also sent B&M a letter in California
demanding that B&M immediately cease use of the domain name and transfer it to ANI.
Under NSI's then-current dispute resolution procedures, the effect of this was to prevent
B&M from continuing use of the domain name unless it sought and obtained a declaratory
judgment establishing its right to the use of <masters.com>. B&M sued ANI in federal
court in California seeking such a declaratory judgment, and also seeking cancellation of
ANI's use of its domain name <masters.org>.
The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over ANI, but the court of
appeals reversed. It held that ANI was not subject to general jurisdiction in California
because its contacts with California were not continuous and systematic.306 The court nevertheless found specific jurisdiction over ANI on the basis of the anticipated effects of
sending the letter to NSI. The court held that "when the defendant is alleged to have
engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a
resident of the forum state," he has engaged in conduct "expressly aimed" at the forum
state. 07 If, in addition, the effects are primarily felt in the forum state, then the "purposeful
availment" prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction has been satisfied. 0° Here,
these requirements were satisfied because ANI's conduct targeted B&M, and ANI knew
that B&M was based in California where it conducted nearly all its business.3°9 In addition,
the contacts constituting purposeful availment-the sending of the letter to NSI-gave rise
to the suit. Accordingly, the second prong needed to support the exercise of specific juris310
diction was satisfied.
The final prong requires that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable. The court found
that ANI had not analyzed the factors needed to meet its burden to make a "compelling

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
Seeid. at 1086.
Id. at 1087.
See id. at 1087-88.
See id. at 1088.
Seeid.
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case" that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.' Accordingly, ANI was subject to personal jurisdiction in California.
In a separate opinion, two judges stated that they "concur in the opinion only on the assumption that Augusta National, through its letter to NSI, engaged in tortious conduct, i.e.,
that they intended to effect a conversion of the <masters.com> domain name," a claim as to
which they expressed skepticism."' They concluded that "U]urisdiction in California would
be ripe for challenge if following the development of trial it should appear that Augusta National acted reasonably and in good faith to protect its trademark against an infringer.""'

Bancroft & Masters contrasts with Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc.,31 4 in which the
defendant's business consisted of diagnostic testing of blood samples from newborn infants.
It operated a website named <neogenscreening.com>. This website was informational and
did not accept orders. Customers had to obtain collection forms and then submit a sample
to the defendant in Pennsylvania by mail. Customers could obtain test results by mail or on
the defendant's website using a password. The court held that such website use was "passive"
and insufficient to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in plaintiff's home state of Michigan.
The defendant's other contacts with Michigan were insufficient to subject it to jurisdiction
there. Plaintiff could not rely on the alleged adverse effects to its trademark in Michigan to
confer jurisdiction because there was no evidence of intentionally tortious conduct.'
2. Cybersquatting
In Alitalia-LineeAeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com,3' 6 plaintiff Alitalia was an Italian
airline that provides service to and from the United States. Defendant TechologiaJPR, Inc.,
was a Dominican Republic corporation that operated an Internet gambling site under the
domain name <casinoalitalia.com>. Technologia had no offices, employees, or physical
property in the United States. Alitalia contended that the use of the domain name, as well
as the use of the term "alitalia" on the web page violated Alitalia's rights in the mark
"alitalia." It brought suit in federal court in Virginia under the Antercybersquatting Con17
sumer Protection Act.'
The court held that Alitalia could proceed in rem against the domain name only if it
could first establish that personal jurisdiction could not be exercised over the registrant,
Technologia JPR. Addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction, the court denied Technologia's motion to dismiss. It found that casinoalitalia.com was an "active" website as that
term is used in the seminal case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.3 8 That

311. See id. at 1088-89. The court listed the relevant factors as:
(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state, (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum, (3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state,
(4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the
controversy, (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief,
and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.
Id. at 1088 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
312. Id. at 1089.
313. Id.
314. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 724 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
315. See id. at 731.
316. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
318. Zippo Mfg Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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was because Internet gambling inherently involved substantial interaction between the user
and the website, including the purchase and redemption of "credits," as well as user registration. Furthermore, five of the site's 750 registrants had provided billing addresses in
Virginia. Accordingly, defendants' activities were directed at Virginia. Furthermore, Alitalia
suffered harm to its mark and image among Virginia consumers from defendants' continuing course of conduct. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction under Virginia's long-arm
statute, and the exercise of such jurisdiction was constitutional.
VII. Service of Process Abroad
Once again, this past year did not yield any significant federal appellate decisions regarding service of process abroad. Nevertheless, there were interesting decisions involving
the time limits for service of process, service of process by mail and the interplay of state
substituted services laws and the Hague Convention.
A.

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION

1. Time Limits on Service
The courts continue to differ in their approach to reconciling the difficulties inherent in
effecting service in a foreign country with the time limits imposed under state laws.
As noted in the previous annual update, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the issue
of the timeliness of service of process abroad in Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau AG.31 9
There the plaintiffs brought a diversity action against a German company in the Western
District of Washington. The action was filed just prior to the expiration of the applicable
statute of limitations. Washington law required service of process not later than ninety days
after the filing of the complaint. In this case, service was effected by the German central
authority 122 days after the complaint was filed. The delay was attributed, in part, to the
plaintiffs' failure to deliver translated documents to the German central authority. The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to serve the complaint in a timely fashion,
which resulted in the action being barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the case was appropriate for certification to the
Washington Supreme Court due to "the tension it presents between state and international
law."320 The court agreed, noting that:
The Hague Convention requires plaintiffs to surrender control of service of process to a designated central authority in a signatory county and wait for an indefinite period of time while
it serves the defendant according to the laws of its county. It is unclear whether, under these
32
circumstances, Washington's 90-day time limit for executing service of process applies. '
The Washington Supreme Court held that the ninety-day time limit for executing service
of process is tolled once the necessary documents are transmitted to the designated
authority.322 The Washington Supreme Court further held that plaintiffs who act in a timely fashion should not be penalized by the delays or inefficiencies of a foreign central
authority.3

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau AG, 196 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1079.
See Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau, AG, 141 Wn.2d 670, 10 P.3d 371 (2000).
See id. at 378.
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Other courts, notably the courts of Wisconsin, are substantially more rigid in their apet al.,32 4 for example, the court, citing approvingly of the
proach. In Rogers v. IMA, S.r.l.
ruling in Conservatorship of Prom v. Sumitomo Rubber,32 dismissed an action after finding
that the defendants were not served within the ninety days required under Wisconsin law.
The court noted with discernable ire that the plaintiffs did not send the summons and
complaint for translation and eventual service until sixty-six days after the initial filing and
that, once submitted for translation, service had been completed within seventy-eight days
(or well within the ninety-day limit).
3 6
The Wisconsin Court's frustration was shared in Yellowave Corporationv. Mana et al.1
where the court, citing Travers Tool Co. v. Southern Overseas Express Line, Inc.,327 held that
"where service is in a foreign country, the Court uses a flexible due diligence standard to
determine whether service of process was timely. 328 In that case, however, the plaintiff had
not even attempted service of process over 170 days after the complaint was filed.
2. Service by Mail underArticle 10(a)
The issue of whether Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention authorizes service of process
by mail continued to be addressed by the courts. In Friede & Goldman, Ltd. v. Gotaverken
Arendal Consultants,AB,32 9 the court held that the Hague Convention permits service of
process by mail pursuant to Article 10(a), stating that other courts' reading of the difference
between "send" and "service" as prohibiting service of process directly by mail "elevates
form over substance." 338 The result was similar in Schiffer v. Mazda Motor Corporation,33'
where the court stated that "after careful review, this Court adopts the view that Article 10
does permit service of process by mail," 332 and ParadigmEntertainment,Inc. v. Video System
Co., Ltd., 333 where the court held valid service of process effected through mail by the
Secretary of State of Texas on a Japanese defendant conducting business in Texas without
having designated an agent for service of process.
The issue of whether documents being served under the Hague Convention must be
translated also garnered some attention. In Heredia v. Transport S.A.S., Inc.,3 4 for example,
the court held that, while some countries may require translations under Article 5 when
the central authority is used to effect service of process, service by mail does not require
translation. By contrast, in Rhodes v. J.P.Sauer & Sohn, Inc.,335 the court granted defendant's
motion to quash service where plaintiffs attempted to effect service by mailing an English

324. Rogers v. IMA, S.r.l,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
325. Conservatorship of Prom v. Sumitomo Rubber Indust., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 657 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999),
denied 599 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1999).
326. Yellowave Corp. v. Mana, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14813 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
327. Travers Tool Co. v. Southern Overseas Express Line, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1582 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
328. Id. at *5.
329. Friede & Goldman, Ltd. v. Gotaverken Arendal Consultants, AB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3319 (E.D.
La. 2000).
330. Id. at*12.
331. Schiffer v. Mazda Motor Corp., 192 F.R.D. 335 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
332. Id. at 337.
333. Paradigm Entm't, Inc. v. Video Sys. Co., Ltd., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2667 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
101 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
334. Heredia v. Transport S.A.S.,
335. Rhodes v.J.P. Sauer & Sohn, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 746 (W.D. La. 2000).
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version of the summons and complaint to defendants residing in Germany. There the court
noted that, as permitted by the Hague Convention, Germany specifically rejected the provisions of the Hague Convention that permitted service of process by mail and mandated
that all documents for service must be translated into German. These cases, of course,
highlight the need to carefully research the service requirements of each country, even those
that are signatories to the Hague Convention.
3. Additional Signatories to Hague Service Convention
Three countries became signatories to the Hague Convention in 2000: Mexico on June
1, 2000, and Bulgaria and the Republic of Korea on August 1, 2000.
B. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION

There were no new signatories to the Inter-American Convention or the Additional
Protocol to the Convention in 2000.
VIII. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The recognition and enforcement by U.S. courts of foreign arbitration awards are governed by the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. 3 6 The recognition and enforcement by U.S. courts of foreign court judgments are governed by the principles of comity as set forth in Hilton v. Guyot.3" Although
no federal statute or treaty covers the enforcement of foreign court judgments, many states
have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which codifies the
principles set forth in Hilton.33 8

As reported last year, a Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International Law is preparing a draft Convention on international jurisdiction and the effects

of foreign judgments. This Special Commission conducted the second in a series of four
meetings at The Hague during March 3-13, 1998.11 9 On June 18, 1999, the Special Commission provisionally adopted a preliminary draft Convention.

4°

The Special Commission

revised the draft Convention at a meeting held at The Hague during October 1999.141 The
Diplomatic Conference to prepare the final text of the Convention is scheduled to be

336. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 [hereinafter
Convention].
337. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
338. See generally Christopher Givson, InternationalLitigation, 31 Ir'L LAW. 347 (1997) (discussing the
recognition of foreign judgments by United States courts).
339. Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of March 1998 on InternationalJurisdictionand the Effects
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Prel. Doc. No. 9, at p. 11 (1999), available at http://
www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. The first meeting took place at The Hague in June 1997, which is
reported in Synthesis of the Work ofthe Special Commission of.June 1997 on InternationalJurisdictionand the Effects
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Prel. Doc. No. 8 (November 1997), available at http://
www.hcch.net/e/workprog/dgn.html.

340. The status of the work being performed by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law can be found at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. The PreliminaryDraft
Convention on Jurisdiction and ForeignJudgments in Civil and CommercialMatters, adopted by the Special Commission on October 30, 1999, can be found at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html.
341. See id.
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conducted in two sessions. The first session will be held in June 2001; the second session
will be held in late 2001 or in early 2002.342
A. CASES CONCERNING THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDs
1. Defenses to Recognition of ForeignArbitralAwards Based on Immunity

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSLA) 3 43 grants immunity to foreign states from
suit in the United States unless an exception applies. 344 An exception to a foreign sovereign's
immunity to suit in the United States for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award arises
where the foreign sovereign has agreed to arbitration in a Convention state. In S & Davis
International,Inc. v. The Republic of Yemen,"4 S & Davis International (S & Davis) and Gen-

eral Corporation for Foreign Trade and Grains of Yemen (General)346 entered into a contract for the sale of wheat? 47 The contract provided for arbitration of any disputes arising
under the contract by the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) in London, England. 8 The GAFTA panel of arbitrators found General libel for breach of contract, and
49
an appellate arbitration panel affirmed, awarding S & Davis $17 million in damages?
S & Davis then brought suit in the Northern District of Alabama to enforce its arbitration
award against General. 50 General claimed it was immune from suit under the FSIA and
sought to dismiss the enforcement action. 5' S & Davis first asserted that General had
waived its immunity from suit to enforce the arbitral award by agreeing to arbitrate in a
member state to the Convention even though Yemen itself was not a member of the Con-

vention." ' The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that an agreement to arbitrate in a Convention State, without more, failed to demonstrate the requisite intent to
353
waive its sovereign immunity from suit in the United States.
However, the Eleventh Circuit found that jurisdiction existed for the U.S. court to enforce the foreign arbitral award based on the arbitration exception found in 28 U.S.C.

342. See id.
343. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1994) [hereinafter FSIA]. For a discussion
of the FSIA, see Douglas K. Miller, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34
INT'L LAW. 553 (2000).
344. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
345. S & Davis v. Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000).
346. The Ministry of Supply and Trade and The Republic of Yemen were also named as defendants. Id. at
1295. The court held that General was an agency and instrumentality of The Republic of Yemen. See id. at
1298-1300, 1302.
347. See id. at 1295.
348. See id. at 1295-96.
349. Seeid. at 1297.
350. See id. at 1295.
351. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), which provides in pertinent part that "A foreign state shall not
be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case--() in which the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication..
352. See id. at 1301.
353. See id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442-43, 109 S. Ct.
683 (1989) (holding that a foreign state cannot waive immunity where agreement contains no mention ofwaiver
of immunity to suit in the United States or the availability of a cause of action in the United States); and
Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument of implied waiver where
the foreign sovereign is not a signatory to the Convention although the sovereign agreed to arbitration in a
Convention State)).
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§ 1605(a)(6)(B). 54 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that an arbitral award rendered by a
signatory state to the New York Convention fell within the arbitration exception to immunity
under the FSIA.35s The court observed that the exception under § 1605(a)(6)(B) did not
affect the contractual rights of the parties under the arbitration agreement, but only the6
issue of what tribunal may hear a dispute regarding the enforcement of an arbitral award11
2. Decisions Subject to Confirmationunder the Convention

The Convention refers to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral "awards." Regardless of the label attached to an arbitration decision, courts are inclined to confirm the
decision if it is final. In Publicis Communication v. True North Communications Inc.,"' the

Seventh Circuit concluded that an order to produce certain tax documents constituted a
final decision that permitted enforcement of the order by a U.S. district court under the
New York Convention. The dispute involved the breakup of a joint venture between two
advertising companies. The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes pertaining to the breakup
before the London Court of International Arbitration.35 One dispute arbitrated centered
on whether Publicis would be required to produce certain tax information to True North.
True North requested the tribunal for an award on the tax record issue.359 The chairman
of the tribunal, signing "for and on behalf of the Arbitrators," issued an "order" requiring
Publicis to produce the tax information to True North by November 23, 1998.360 Publicis
failed to comply, and True North filed an action in U.S. district court for the Northern
decision.361 The district court confirmed the triDistrict of Illinois to enforce the arbitral
32
bunal's order and Publicis appealed. 6
On appeal, Publicis argued that the New York Convention applied only to arbitral
"awards" rather than to interim orders of the arbitration tribunal. 63 Accordingly, Publicis
urged that relief for the non-production of the tax records was restricted to the tribunal
itself or to the English courts having jurisdiction over the site of the arbitrationsM True
North argued that regardless of whether the tribunal's ruling was termed an "order" or an
"award," the ruling was final and thus subject to confirmation under the New York Con354. See id. at 1301-02. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B) states in pertinent part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in
any case-(6) in which the action is brought... to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement
to arbitrate, if ... (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international
agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
355. See id.
356. See id. (citing Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). The Ministryof Supply
and Trade also asserted that it was not a party to the contract and therefore could not fall under the exception.
The court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to find that General was an agency or instrumentality of
the Ministry and therefore fell under the arbitration exception. Id. at 1302. But see Glencore Denrees Paris v.
Dep't of Nat'l Store Branch 1 (Vietnam), 2000 VL 913843, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing that the Convention is an agreement within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) and concluding that the enforcement of an
award pursuant to a contract entered into by an instrumentality of a foreign state "waived" sovereign immunity
as to the instrumentality but not as to the foreign state itself) (emphasis added).
357. Publicis Communication v. True North Communications Inc., 206 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000).
358. See id. at 727.
359. See id. at 728.
360. Id. at 727.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. at 728.
364. See id.
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vention.36 1 Publicis argued that although a ruling may be final, unless the document granting
the relief bears the word "award," it is not final and is not enforceable166 The Seventh
Circuit rejected this notion, finding it an "extreme and untenable formalism. '' 367 The Seventh Circuit noted that although the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the New York Convention, and various commentators refer to "awards" as final and enforceable, the decision's
content, whatever its label, determined finality, and thus enforceability under the New York
Convention.3 68 The Seventh Circuit observed that the Federal Arbitration Act also refers
to "awards" in conjunction with finality, but that courts had gone beyond labels and into
the substance and impact of a decision to determine its finality.36 9
Noting that the tribunal carved out the tax record issue from the other matters pending
before it on the basis that the production of the information should not wait confirmation
in the final award, the Seventh Circuit rejected Publicis's argument that no urgency existed
with respect to production of the documents.7 0 Rather, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
"[a] ruling on a discrete, time-sensitive issue may be final and ripe for confirmation even
' 37
though other claims remain to be addressed by arbitrators. " '
Alternatively, Publicis argued that the order could not be final because only one arbitrator
signed the order.17 Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, final awards are to be signed
by all three arbitrators.37 3 The Seventh Circuit dismissed this argument since the chairman
signed "for and on behalf" of the other arbitrators.174 A related argument pertained to the
parties' agreement providing that the arbitrators would consult on procedural decisions or
procedural directions to be given, but that such decisions or directions could be signed by
the chairman alone.3 7 Publicis argued that the "for and on behalf" language of the order
indicated that the order was procedural in nature since it did not require the signatures of
all three arbitrators 76 True North urged the opposite, concluding that the "for and on

365. See id.
366. See id.

367. Id.
368. Seeid.
369. See id. at 729. The Seventh Circuit commented that the New York Convention supplemented the
Federal Arbitration Act and therefore decisions under the Federal Act could guide the interpretation of the
New York Convention. See id. (referring to Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 37 F.3d 345 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that an interim order of security constituted a final award permitting immediate challenge where
it was necessary to prevent the final award from becoming meaningless)); Pacific Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v.
Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that an interim order allowing
equitable relief to a final order where it was necessary to preserve the meaningfulness of the final award);
and Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Gov't of Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 304 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting the district court's
conclusion that an award that was final as to issues that were severable was itself subject to immediate
confirmation).
370. See id.
371. Id. The Seventh Circuit distinguished the order to produce the tax documents from procedural matters
such as discovery orders setting a specific date for production. The court noted that discovery relates tofact
gathering as one early step towards an end result, while the production of the tax records was the specific issue
that True North sought to have arbitrated, that is, "whether or not Publicis had to turn over the tax records
is the whole ball of wax." Id.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 729-30 (citing Article 32(4)).
374. Id. at 730. At the urging of the district court, the other two arbitrators signed the order as well. See id.
375. See id. Article 31(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules allows the presiding arbitrator to make
decisions on procedural matters alone. The parties' agreement in this case was an exception to this rule.
376. Seeid.

VOL. 35, NO. 2

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES

535

behalf" language would be superfluous if the order was procedural since the chairman could
have signed the order alone. The court declined to rule on either interpretation; rather, it
focused on the substance and effect of the order in concluding that the order was final and
subject to confirmation under the New York Convention. 77
An award is generally not final if the award is subject to ongoing appellate review in the
arbitration's forum state. In Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc.,378 Consorcio
Rive (Rive) sought to enforce a Mexican arbitral award under the Convention in a Louisiana
federal district court. The defendants contended that the action for recognition of the award
should be stayed or dismissed on the basis that the award was not final under Mexican lawA' 9
Briggs of Cancun (Briggs) filed an action in Mexico seeking to have the arbitral award set
aside.8 0 The Mexican court dismissed Briggs' action, and Briggs appealed the dismissal." '
Rives argued that the Mexican appeal suspended the effect of the Mexican lower court's
dismissal, but failed to suspend the award itself. 2 The district court noted that pursuant
to the Convention, the court could refuse to enforce the award if the award was not yet
binding on the parties or if an action to set aside the award had been filed in the foreign
country." 3 The district court observed that the Mexican action to nullify the award involved
issues of Mexican law best handled by Mexican courts and concluded that the action to
84
enforce the award should be stayed pending reolution of the Mexican proceedings.
3. Oppositions to Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards
Attempts to overturn an award during the confirmation proceeding is difficult. The Convention restricts a district court's ability to review an award for its validity."' The district
court must confirm the award unless it finds one of the enumerated grounds in the Convention for refusing or deferring recognition of the award."' When discovery is sought

377. See id. Publicis also asserted that the order was ambiguous and should have been remanded to the
tribunal for clarification. Although it is not stated in the opinion, the ambiguity apparently was meant to pertain
to whether the order was "procedural" or a "final award" and not the specific nature of what was being ordered.
See id. The court noted that although a "district court should not interpret an ambiguous award," it should,
when possible, "avoid remanding a decision to the arbitrator because of the interest in prompt and final
arbitration." Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court acted correctly in finding the order
unambiguous. In addition, Publicis sought reversal of the district court's decision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)
based on the district court's comment during its oral ruling indicating that the arbitrators did not make it
incontrovertible under the rules what they were intending. See id. The Seventh Circuit found this single comment insufficient to reverse the district court's decision under Rule 60(b)(2), concluding that the comment was
not the basis for the court's ruling. See id.
378. Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 2000 WL 98127 (E.D. La. 2000).
379. See id. at*3.
380. Seeid.
at *1.
381. See id.
382. Seeid.
at *3.
383. See id.
(citing Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the Convention).
384. See id.
(citing Europcar Italia, S.p.A.v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2nd Cir. 1998) (stating
that "a foreign court well-versed in its own law is better suited to determine the validity of the award."). See
also Coutinho Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., 2000 WL 435566 (D. Conn. 2000) (concluding
that under the Convention, petitions to vacate an arbitral award should be filed in the country where the award
was rendered.).
385. See, e.g.,
Yusuaf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042 (1998).
386. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 207
(1999). Article V of the Convention sets forth five grounds for refusing to recognize a foreign arbitral award
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during an enforcement proceeding to challenge the validity of an arbitral award, the discovery must relate to furthering a challenge under one of the Convention's enumerated
grounds.
In Empresa ConstructoraContex Limitada v. Iseki, Inc.,3" 7 Empresa filed suit in the Southern

District of California to enforce its arbitral award obtained in Chile involving a construction
contract dispute. The defendant, Iseki, sought discovery for the purpose of opposing the
enforcement of the award."' Iseki sought the discovery to support its argument that its due
process rights were violated during the arbitration proceedings because it was unable to
appear and present its defense, therefore causing it to suffer a "trial in absentia."38 9 Iseka
contended that the discovery would show that Empresa was aware of a criminal investigation
relating to the construction, that Iseka's representatives could not appear in Chile without
being subject to arrest by the Chilean authorities, and that Iseka was therefore precluded
from defending itself in the arbitration proceedings. 9° Iseka based its claim of entitlement
to discovery on Article V(1)(b) of the Inter-American Convention,'" which provides that a
court may refuse to recognize an arbitral award if the nonprevailing party was unable to
present a defense.392 The district court denied Iseka's request for discovery, holding that
Iseka failed to provide "'clear evidence of impropriety' or another fundamental defect in
the arbitration proceedings the requested discovery would substantiate."3' 93
The district court indicated that "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, a confirming
court is not to reconsider an arbitrator's findings."3 94 Rather, unless it finds one of the
grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition of enforcement of the arbitral award specified
in the Convention, the court shall confirm the award. 91The district court concluded that
the discovery would add nothing to the defenses available under the Inter-American Con-

as follows: (a)The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were ... under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the award is invoked
was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or (c)The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration... ; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties... , or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law
of which, that award was made. Convention, art. V(1). Two other grounds are possible under the Convention
as well. Enforcement can be refused if the subject matter being arbitrated is not capable of being settled by
arbitration, or the recognition of the award would be contrary to public policy. See id. art. V(2).
387. Empresa Constructora Contex Limitada v. Iseki, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
388. See id. at 1021.
389. Id. at 1022.
390. See id. at 1023.
391. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 301 etseq. [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]. The Inter-American Convention incorporates portions of both the New
York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. See Empresa ConstructoraCentexLimitada,
106 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (citations omitted). The district court concluded that authority addressing discovery
in post-arbitration proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention would equally
apply to application and interpretation of discovery under the Inter-American Convention. See id.
392. See Empresa ConstructoraCentex Limitada, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1023-24 (citing Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.
1998)).
395. See id. at 1024 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1999)).
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vention.3 96 First, the district court observed that Iseka made no claim that the arbitration
contained defects unknown to it at the time of the arbitration such as arbitrator bias or
fraud in the proceedings.3 97 Nor did Iseka identify any due process objections or other
objections it made during the arbitration relating to its inability to have its corporate representatives attend the arbitration.3 98 The district court concluded that "[t]he discovery Iseki
now seeks could have been identified and pursued at the time of the arbitration."3 99
An award that is governed by the Convention deprives a district court of subject matter
jurisdiction to vacate the arbitral award. In Coutinho Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus
Trading, Inc.,400 Coutinho Caro entered into contracts for the sale of steel billets to Marcus
Trading and Hunan Province Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation (Hunan).
The contracts provided for arbitration in China before the China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).40' Coutinho Caro refused to perform under
the contract, alleging failure on the part of Marcus Trading and Hunan to satisfy certain
conditions precedent, and Marcus and Hunan sought to arbitrate the dispute before
CIETAC.4 ° Coutinho Caro asserted in the arbitration that no valid contract existed for
arbitration. 43 However, the arbitration panel held the arbitration provision contained in
the contract was severable and provided it with jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 4 The
arbitration panel held that the contracts were valid, that Coutinho Caro had breached the
contracts and awarded Marcus Trading and Hunan damages.-5 Marcus Trading and Hunan
°6
then sought enforcement of the arbitral awards in Connecticut district court- Coutinho
Caro filed a petition to vacate the arbitral award, and Marcus Trading filed a motion to
dismiss the petition to vacate, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the petition to vacate. 407 The district court concluded that the Convention governed
the arbitral award at issue and dismissed the petition to vacate. 409 The district court rejected
Coutinho Caro's contentions that the Convention was inapplicable to the award at issue
and that the Federal Arbitration Act provided the court with jurisdiction to hear its petition.4w The district court observed that the award was rendered in a jurisdiction (China)
that was a signatory to the Convention, and therefore the award was governed by the
Convention.410 The district court further noted that the Federal Arbitration Act relied on
by Coutinho Caro was inapplicable to the extent it conflicted with the Convention.41' After
determining that the Convention was the governing law, the court concluded that the
Convention deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition to vacate based

396. See id. at 1025.
397. Seeid.
at1026.
398. See id.
399. Id. at1027.
400. Coutinho Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., 2000 WL 435566 (D.Conn. 2000).
at*l-2.
401. See id.
402. See id. at*1.
at *2.
403. Seeid.
404. Seeid.
at 2.
405. Seeid.
406. Seeidat*7.
407. Seeid.
at*3.
408. See id.
409. See id.
at *3-5.
410. Seeid.
411. Seeid. at*5 n.3.
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on provisions contained in the Convention referencing that actions to set aside an award
are to be "taken by a competent authority of the country in which the award was made or
2
by a competent authority of the country under the law of which the award was made.""
Jurisdictional issues can also arise where one of the parties named in the enforcement
action was not a party to the contract arbitrated and did not participate in the arbitration
proceedings. In Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc.,41 3 the defendant David
Briggs Enterprises, Inc. (Enterprises) moved for dismissal of Consoricio Rive's (Rive) suit
for enforcement of its Mexican arbitral award under the Convention. The dispute arbitrated
in Mexico pertained to a lease agreement entered into between Briggs of Cancun (Briggs)
and Rive for property to operate a restaurant. 414 The action to enforce the arbitral award
named Enterprises, the parent corporation of Briggs, because Rive contended that Briggs
was under-capitalized and might not be able to pay the award assessed by the Mexican
tribunal. 415 The claim against Enterprises was based on a state-law alter-ego theory that
would make Enterprises liable for payment of the award." 6 Enterprises argued that it was
not a party to the lease agreement or the arbitration proceedings and moved to dismiss the
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the basis that the Convention
does not provide for subject matter jurisdiction of a claim against Enterprises for enforcement of the arbitral award. 4' 7 Although agreeing that the Convention did not provide for
jurisdiction over Enterprises, 41' the district court concluded that pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), it had supplemental jurisdiction over Enterprises and the alter-ego claim. 419 The
district court observed that "[t]he entire matter of whether the award should be confirmed;
420
and, if so, which entity (or entities) is liable for it should be decided in one action.
In the same case, Briggs also sought to assert counterclaims in the district court action
defending against enforcement of the award by Rive.421 Rive contended that the counterclaims were barred by resjudicata.422 The district court agreed with Rive, finding that Briggs
had an opportunity to assert its counterclaims in the arbitration proceedings.411 The district
court noted that Briggs was aware of the arbitration, that Briggs filed an answer in the
proceedings, but elected not to participate further in the arbitration. 4 4 The court found

412. Id. at *6(citing Convention, Article V(l)(e) and Article VI). The court also relied on Int'l Standard
Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (observing that a
suggestion that a court can set aside a foreign award based on its own domestic law "defies the logic of both
of the Convention debates and of the final text, and ignores the nature of the international arbitral system.").
413. Consorcio Rive, S.A. de C.V. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 2000 WL 98127 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2000).
414. Seeid. at*l.
415. See id.
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. See id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1999), which provides that "any party to the arbitration may
apply to any court having jurisdiction ... for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the
arbitration.").
419. See id. at *2. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides district courts with supplemental jurisdiction over claims
"that are so related to claims in the [main] action ... that they form part of the same case or controversy ...
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties."
420. Consorcio
Rive, S.A. de C.V.,
2000 WL 98127, at *3.
421. Id. at *1.
422. See id.
423. See id. at*4.
424. See id.
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that the counterclaims sought to be asserted related to the same transaction and occurrence,
agreement and property that was involved in the arbitration proceedings. 42 5 The district
court concluded that the counterclaims "could have been and should have been raised
in the original arbitration," and held that the claims were barred under the resjudicata
46
doctrine.
Resjudicata and collateral estoppel were also asserted as a basis for barring enforcement
of an arbitral award in Coutinbo Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc. 427 Prior to
the arbitration award, Coutinho Caro sued Marcus Trading in U.S district court for breach
of contract. Marcus Trading moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and
for a stay of the proceedings pending arbitration. 425 The court dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction, but found in its ruling that no contract existed between the parties. 4 9 In the
action to enforce the arbitral award, Coutinho Caro asserted that enforcement of the award
was barred on that basis of resjudicataand collateral estoppel in view of the court's prior
ruling that no contract existed. 4 10 The court rejected the application of resjudicata (claim
preclusion), noting that at the time Marcus Trading moved to dismiss Coutinho Caro's
breach of contract suit, there was no arbitral award to enforce. Thus, the claims to enforce
4
the arbitral award could not have been brought in the earlier action by Coutinho Caro. 11
With respect to collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), the court rejected this argument as
well. The court noted that a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was not an action on
the merits, and that in any event, the finding made with respect to the contract was un2
necessary to the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.41
Coutinho Caro also asserted that the award was unenforceable since there was not an
agreement in writing in contravention to the Convention's requirement that an agreement
in writing be provided. 433 Specifically, Coutinho Caro argued that no agreement ever existed. 434 The court found that the parties had signed a contract, although the contract was
subject to a condition precedent. 411Nevertheless, the court concluded that it was a contract,
noting that the parties did not structure a condition precedent to the existence of the
436
contract.

425. See id.
426. Id. In the same action, Briggs also asserted that the duty to arbitrate expired with termination of the
contract. Id. at *1 n.2. The district court rejected this argument, noting that unless the agreement specifies
otherwise, obligations to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract survive termination of the contract. See
id. at *5 (citing Nodle Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430
U.S. 243, 251 (1977)).
427. See Coutinho Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., 2000 WL 435566, at *2 (D. Conn.)
428. Seeid.
429. See id. at '1.
430. See id. at *2.
431. See id. at *8-9.
432. See id. at *9-10. The court also noted that with respect to Hunan, the other party seeking to enforce
its arbitral award, the argument based on collateral estoppel could not apply since Hunan was not a party to
the earlier action and had no opportunity to be heard. Id. at *9.
433. Id. at *10 (citing Convention, Article IV(l)(b)).
434. See id.
435. See id. at *11.
436. See id. The court further observed that even assuming that the document at issue was not a contract
under Article 11(2) of the Convention, it was a written agreement indicating that the parties would submit
disputes to arbitration. As such, court concluded that the language of Article H was sufficiently broad to include
the agreement within its scope, noting that the Convention's language should be broadly construed to achieve
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In addition, Coutinho Caro asserted that enforcement of the arbitral award would violate
the public policy of the United States in that the arbitration panel "usurped a role reserved
for the courts when it made the determination that the parties had entered into a valid
arbitration agreement" although the parties disputed whether the agreements ever went
into effect.4 37 The court noted that the public policy defense was narrow in scope, applicable

only when enforcement of the award "would violate the forum state's most basic notions
of morality and justice." 438 Construing Continho Caro's contention as an objection to the
arbitration panel's decision holding the arbitration clause severable from the underlying
contract, the district court concluded that such a decision, even if erroneous, would not
43 9
justify refusing to recognize the award on public policy grounds.
B.

CASES CONCERNING THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS

The party asserting that a foreign judgment should be recognized in a U.S. court has the
burden of proof.- ° Following the principles set forth in Hilton v. Guyot, 41 a foreign judgment should be recognized if the foreign forum (1) allowed for a court of competent jurisdiction to give a full and fair trial on the issues presented, (2) ensured that justice was
impartially administered, (3) ensured that the trial was free of fraud or prejudice, (4) had
proper jurisdiction over the parties, and (5) the judgment did not violate public policy."

2

44 3

In Shen v. Leo A. Daly Company, Inc., the plaintiff was found liable for the payment of
Taiwan taxes by a Taiwan court after the company (Daly) withdrew from the Taiwan market
and terminated its employee Shen, but failed to remove him as the designated responsible
person. Shen then filed suit in federal district court in Nebraska seeking an order requiring
Daly to pay the taxes. 4 " The district court granted Shen the relief requested, and Daly
appealed arguing that the Taiwan judgment holding Shen liable for payment of the taxes
should be recognized and given preclusive effect by the U.S. court. 4 The Eighth Circuit
disagreed, finding that Daly failed to carry its burden of proof as to the establishment of
each of the Hilton factors.4- The court observed that Daly's simple assertion that the Taiwan
judgment should be given preclusive effect without providing any authority or evidence as
to the impartiality of the Taiwan tribunal or Taiwan's compatibility with due process insufficient to provide grounds for recognizing the judgment.-' Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit declined to find that the Taiwan judgment should be recognized and provided preclusive effect in the U.S. court action. 44
its recognition and enforcement purposes. Id. (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 933 (2d
Cir. 1983)).

437. Id.
438. Id. at *12 (citing Parsons & Whittimore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generate De L'Industrie Du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974)).
439. See id. at *11-12. The court also noted the conflict among the courts on the issue of whether arbitration
clauses are severable. See id. at *12 (citations omitted).
440. See Shen v. Leo A. Daly Co., 222 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2000).
441. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
442. See Shen, 222 F.3d at 476.

443. Id.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 476.
id.
id.
id. at 476-77.
id. at 477.
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A U.S. court may refuse to recognize a foreign court's judgment if the judgment was
rendered without affording the party due process of law. The decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in The Society ofLloyd's v. Ashenden 449 interpreted the Illinois
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act's 450 due process requirement"I as
requiring compliance with the "international concept of due process" as opposed to the
452
concept of due process developed in the United States.
In The Society of Lloyd's, Lloyd's sought to enforce in Illinois money judgments obtained
in an English court against American members of insurance syndicates managed by Lloyd's
using the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. 453 The defendants
urged the district court to decline to enforce the English judgments, arguing that the judgments were rendered while denying the defendants' due process of law as required under
the Illinois Recognition Act. 454 The district court rejected the defendants' argument and
entered summary judgment in favor of Lloyd's. 45 5 The Seventh Circuit agreed and affirmed

the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit stated that:
[We] cannot believe that the Illinois statute is intended to bar the enforcement of all judgments
of any foreign legal system that does not conform its procedural doctrines to the latest twist
and turn of our courts regarding, for example, the circumstances under which due process
requires an opportunity for a hearing in advance of the deprivation of a substantive right rather
than afterwards.

4

11

Rather, the Seventh Circuit construed the due process requirement under the Illinois
Recognition Act as requiring that the foreign procedure be compatible with due process
requirements, i.e., that the foreign procedure is fundamentally fair.4 "1The Seventh Circuit
labeled this notion of due process the "international concept of due process" to distinguish
it from the concept of due process as it developed in the United States. 458 Noting that few,
if any, foreign judgments would be enforceable in Illinois if the foreign forum was required
to meet the specifics of American due process, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants'
argument that U.S. courts must inquire into whether the foreign forum's proceedings met
the due process requirements as understood in the Illinois case law and the case law of
49
other American jurisdictions. 1

449. The Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000).
450. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-618 to 626 (1992).
451. The Illinois Recognition Act states that foreign judgments are unenforceable in Illinois if "the judgment
was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law." 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/12-621.
452. Society'y of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 476-77.
453. See id. at 475.
454. See id. at 476.
455. See id.
456. Id.
457. See id. at 476-77 (citing Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687-88 (7th Cir.
1987)).
458. Id. at 477. The Seventh Circuit noted that no evidence was presented regarding the English legal system,
but considered the issue as beyond doubt. The Seventh Circuit observed that the issue was neither a question
of fact nor a question of law, but a question of the law of a foreign nation that could be answered by any
relevant sources and materials regardless of whether it would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Pittway Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1996); 9 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2446 (1995)).
459. See id. at 477-78.
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In The Society of Lloyd's, certain of the insurance syndicates refused to pay assessments to
Lloyd's (reinsurance premiums) to a newly created reinsurance company designed to reinsure risks underwritten by the syndicates in the wake of huge underwriting losses incurred
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.40° Lloyd's sued the non-paying syndicates in the English
courts based on a contract with the reinsurance company.4 6 The defendants opposed the
suit on the basis of two clauses that they asserted deprived them of due process. The first
clause, referred to as "pay now, sue later" precluded setting off against the assessment claim
by Lloyd's any claim the defendant might have against Lloyd's.- The second clause (the
conclusive evidence clause) made the amount of the assessment determined by Lloyd's
conclusive in the absence of manifest error.46
The Seventh Circuit agreed that the clauses curtailed the defendants' procedural rights,
but noted that "[h]ow much process is due depends on the circumstances. '"4 6 4 The Seventh
Circuit observed that the only source of funds for the reinsurance was the syndicates themselves. The pay now, sue later provision was designed to allow immediate funding of the
reinsurance company, a goal that would be unachievable if the defendants were permitted
to set off against the assessment due any claims they might have against Lloyd's. Otherwise,
as the Seventh Circuit noted, full collection of the needed assessments would be deferred
until the claims were adjudicated. 456 Similarly, the conclusive evidence clause allowed collecting the assessment immediately rather than waiting for the outcome of a litigation to
determine the accuracy of the assessment.466 The Seventh Circuit concluded that under
these circumstances, the process did not violate international due process, or domestic due
process.467 The Seventh Circuit noted that the concept of pay now, sue later had survived
due process challenges in American courts.4 s Moreover, the Seventh Circuit commented
that the process due was the process afforded by the English courts, and not the process
afforded by the Lloyd's pursuant to the pay now, sue later clause. 469 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the English courts held that the defendants had waived their procedural rights
in advance pursuant to the contract.40 With respect to the conclusive evidence provision,
the Seventh Circuit likened the provision to a curtailment of pretrial discovery, noting that

460. See id. at 478.
461. See id. Substitute agents designated by Lloyd's Council signed the contract on behalf of the non-paying
defendants.
462. Id.
463. See id.
464. Id. at 479.
465. See id.
466. See id. at 479-80.
467. See id. at 479.
468. See id. (citing Debreceni v. Merchants Terminal Corp., 889 F.2d 1, 3-4 (lst
Cir. 1989)). The Seventh
Circuit analogized to procedures used in federal law when a firm withdraws from a multi-employer pension
plan wherein the withdrawing firm is required to pay the assessment of the firm's vested but unfunded benefits
and to save any challenges for a separate suit (citing the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1399(c)(2), 1401(d); and Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 800 F.2d 641, 642 (7th Cir.
1986) (per curiam)).
469. See id. at 479.
470. See id. The Seventh Circuit commented that advance waiver of procedural rights brought the case
within the rule in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972) wherein under a
challenge on due process grounds, the Court upheld the enforcement of a cognovit note wherein a debtor
consents in advance to a creditor obtaining a judgment against the debtor on the note without notice or a
hearing. See id.
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pretrial discovery "is not a part of the U.S. concept of due process"471 or international due
472
process.
On a separate issue, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' contention that with
respect to a foreign judgment, as opposed to a judgment rendered by a court in another
U.S. jurisdiction, the citations in aid of the collection effort may not be issued until the
court first enters an order recognizing the enforceability of the foreign judgment413 The
Seventh Circuit found no basis for requiring a judgment creditor to bring a first proceeding
to enforce the judgment, and a separate proceeding to collect on the judgment, noting that
the issue as to the judgment's enforceability is raised as a defense to the compliance with
4
the citation proceedingY.

471. Id. at 480 (citing Midway Motor Lodge v. Innkeepers' Telemanagement & Equip. Corp., 54 F.3d 406,
408 (7th Cir. 1995); Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977); and Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc.,
189 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 1999)).
472. See id. (citing Hague Convention, art. 23 (reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 1781); Panama Processes, S.A. v.
Cities Service Co., 500 F. Supp. 787, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 650 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1981); Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse, [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.); and GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 843-55 (1996)).
473. See id. at 481.
474. Seeid.
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